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COMMENT
HOPE V. PERALES: ABORTION RIGHTS UNDER THE
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION
INTRODUCTION
Although the public had anticipated that Hope v. Perales1
would be a landmark decision testing the scope of abortion
rights under the state constitution,2 the case that was sup-
posed to be the most widely and intensely disputed decision on
the New York Court of Appeals' calendar fell short of expecta-
tions. Both sides of the abortion issue had touted the case as
a "defining moment in the abortion debate."3 Pro-choicers had
extolled that Hope was "the most important affirmation of
reproductive choice since the repeal in 1970 of New York's
criminal law against abortion," the year in which both the New
York Supreme Court and Appellate Division declared that the
New York State Constitution, independently from the United
States Constitution, protects a woman's freedom of choice.4
Federal constitutional protection of women's constitutional
right to reproductive choice had been eroding with virtually
every privacy case decided by the United States Supreme
Court since Roe v. Wade.5 Young and poor women who are
1 83 N.Y.2d 563, 634 N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994).
Gary Spencer, Abortion Before Court of Appeals, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 1, 1994 at 2.
Gary Spencer, Court of Appeals Weighs Requiring Funds for Abortion,
N.YJ,.J., Mar. 18, 1994 at 52.
" Donna Lieberman & Catherine Weiss, New York Forum about Justice: New
York's Constitution Protects its Own, NEWSDAY, April 25, 1991, at 22.
r 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to privacy under federal Constitution in-
cludes a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy). For a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's erosion of abortion rights, see infra notes 255-268 and accompanying
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most vulnerable have felt the impact of this erosion most
acutely. Regardless of the erosion at the federal level, New
York's lower courts have continued to affirm and expand the
state constitutional right to abortion. In Hope v. Perales, the
New York Supreme Court and the Appellate Division assured
state protection for this right by holding that the New York
State Constitution precludes the Pre-Natal Care and Assis-
tance Program (PCAP),7 which funds prenatal and childbirth
services for low-income women, from excluding medically nec-
essary abortions from its coverage.'
Hope's potential remained unrealized when the New York
Court of Appeals held that PCAP's exclusion of medically nec-
essary abortions did not violate either the Due Process or the
Equal Protection clauses of the state constitution.9 The court
reasoned that the legislature's decision to fund only one course
of conduct did not infringe upon poor women's due process
right to abortion because this funding choice did not prohibit
women from obtaining abortions.0 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that funding childbirth and not abortion
violated an obligation under the due process clause for the
state not to influence the exercise of a fundamental right."
The court found that there was no evidence that eligible wom-
en were induced by PCAP to continue their pregnancies and
therefore relinquish their right of choice." The court therefore
found that PCAP's selective funding in favor of childbirth did
not constitute an impermissible burden on this right."
For the same reason, the court also rejected the argument
that the funding scheme violated the Equal Protection
clause. 4 The court simply stated that plaintiffs' equal protec-
text.
See infra notes 262-269 and accompanying text.
Prenatal Care Act of 1989, Ch. 584, 1989 N.Y. LAWS 1224 (codified in N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2521, 2522, 2529, (McKinney 1989) (effective Jan. 1, 1990));
see notes 18-44 and accompanying text.
' Hope v. Perales, 189 A.D.2d 287, 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948, 954, (1st Dop't
1993), rev'd, 83 N.Y.2d 563, 63 N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994).
' Hope v. Perales, 83 N.Y.2d 563, 577, 634 N.E.2d 183, 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811,
816 (1994).
10 Id.
n Id. at 575, 634 NE.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
- Id. at 576, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id.at 575, 634 NY..2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d 815.
"' Hope, 83 N.Y.2d. at 576 n.6, 634 N..2d at 187 n.6, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815
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tion clause challenge was at the core of their due process
clause challenge and that both fail for much of the same rea-
sons." The court therefore found that the plaintiffs failed to
prove PCAP even indirectly infringes upon the reproductive
right of choice and upheld the program as rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.
1 6
The most intriguing aspect about Hope is not the courtes
ruling-that the state constitution permits the legislature to
fund, for example, a "one step at a time" pre-natal program to
help infants without having to fund medically necessary abor-
tions.' Rather, Hope is remarkable in that the court of ap-
peals successfully ducked the important legal issues the case
presented. First, the court remained silent as to whether abor-
tion was a fundamental right under the state constitution,
thereby avoiding two controversial issues: abortion rights and
state constitutional expansion beyond federal interpretation.
Second, the court failed to answer whether the government
must remain neutral in the area of reproductive health care.
As a result, the court managed to write a cautious decision
with a narrowly limited holding that did not establish any new
principle of law. This Comment will argue that although the
court did not properly decide Hope, the case may not have
presented the best context to define the scope of abortion
rights under the state constitution. Because abortion funding
cases implicate unpopular notions of public assistance and
controversial questions as to whether the government should
use tax dollars of citizens who morally oppose abortion, Hope
may not have been the most appropriate case to test the state
constitutional waters.
Part I of this Comment will present background informa-
tion on the Pre-natal Care Assistance Act (PCAP). Then, Part
H will outline the facts of Hope, as well as discuss each court's
decision and reasoning. In Part Il, this Comment will analyze
the court of appeals' decision in light of the evidence that was
submitted at trial. Part III will also argue that the court
skewed the evidence in its statement of the record. Part IV will
n.6.
25 Id.
- Id. at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
27 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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conclude that although the decision was improperly decided,
the case may not have been the best context to decide abortion
rights issues for both political and social reasons. This Com-
ment also proposes ways in which the pro-choice movement
still might use Hope to its advantage.
I. TBE PRE-NATAL CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
The now $100 million program, which services 25,000
pregnant women, was created to assist women with incomes
slightly above the Medicaid eligibility standard and to provide
the "often extraordinary medical care necessary to maintain a
healthy pregnancy."19 With the aid of federal fumding, New
York State hoped to promote the health of infants and mothers
and to decrease infant mortality." PCAP achieves this goal by
ensuring adequate prenatal care to pregnant women who,
though not indigent, are deemed less likely to spend available
resources to obtain good prenatal care.21
Congress first established PCAP on the federal level to
give reimbursements to states providing prenatal and related
care to needy pregnant women whose household incomes
exceeded Medicaid eligibility standards.' Federal PCAP is
not Medicaid and the program serves a different population.'
In 1986 Congress amended the federal Medicaid 2' statute to
*' Gregg Birnbaum, Pro-choicers Livid as State Court Limits Tax-Funded Abor-
tions, N.Y. POST, May 6, 1994, at 10.
" Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 305, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 959 (Murphy, P.J., dissenting).
2 Hope, 83 N.Y.2d. at 573, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813. New
York's infant mortality and low birthweight rates are higher than the national
average. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 290, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
" Id. (quoting Mem. of State Exec. Dept., 1989 McKinney's Session Laws of
N.Y., at 2218).
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 184-85, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 293, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
In 1965, Congress created Medicaid, a federal-state cost sharing program in
which states are reimbursed for expenditures for a wide range of medical services
for qualified individuals. The program serves approximately 31 million enrollees
whose combined incomes and resources are deemed by law to be insufficient to
meet the cost of necessary medical care. The Cost Implications of Including Abor-
tion Coverage under Medicaid, ISSUES IN BRIEF (The Alan Guttmacher Institute,
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1993, at 1 (hereinafter "Cost Implications"); see also, Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). A state choosing to participate in Medicaid can
elect to provide medical services to either the "categorically needy"-those who get
financial aid from specific federal aid programs, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(19)(A) (West
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create an optional category of Medicaid-eligible persons com-
posed of pregnant women and infants with family incomes at
or below 100% of the federal poverty line.' Under the 1987
amendment to the federal Medicaid statute, Medicaid coverage
of pregnancy-related services became mandatory.' The
amendment required each state to extend eligibility to women
up to 133% of the poverty line, but states can opt to extend
benefits to women whose income is 185% of poverty line, with-
out regard to other resources these women may haveY Un-
like Medicaid, which provides reimbursement for all medically
necessary care rendered to qualified individuals, POAP only
reimburses expenditures authorized by statute. 
2
In 1987, the New York State Legislature enacted the pilot
Supp. 1993), or the "medically needy"--those who do not qualify for federal pro-
grams but who lack adequate resources for medical care. 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)(10)(C)
(West Supp. 1993). The national average of income eligibility for those receiving
Medicaid is 50% of the federal poverty line, or $5,945 a year. Cost Implications,
supra at 1. Once a state participates in the voluntary program, it must comply
with both federal statutes and regulations. Weaver v. Regan 886 F.2d 194, 197
(8th Cir. 1989) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985)). Medic-
aid now includes funding only for abortions that are the result of rape or incest or
are necessary to save the mother's life. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1994). Notwithstanding
this restriction, states are entirely free, at their own option and expense, to offer
additional services, including abortions. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 n.16
(1980) ("A participating State is free, if it so chooses, to include in its Medicaid
plan those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is un-
available.?).
I' Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9401, 100
Stat. 1874, 2050-52 (1986).
1 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4101,
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-1400 (1987), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)A){i)X1994). Federal law
sets out mandatory and optional categories of services funded under Medicaid. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396(aX4)(10), 1396(d)(a) (Supp. V. 1993). States may not receive federal
funding if they adopt standards and income-eligibility levels more restrictive than
"mandatory" federal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c) (Supp. V. 1993). A state will
still receive federal funds if it provides optional services, but coverage of these
services is not necessary to obtain federal reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)
(4)(10), 1396(d)(a) (Supp. V. 1993).
27 Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813. The option
of extending mandatory coverage up to 1337 of the poverty line exids only for
states that had not already extended coverage above 133% as of December 19,
1989. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(1)(2)(A)(ii)(ID, (iv)D (1994). In fact, for states like New
York that opted before December 1989 to extend these services to women up to
185% of the poverty line, coverage for this class of beneficiaries must be main-
tained at this level. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(1)2XA)(iv) (1994).
2 Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc.2d 985, 990, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1991).
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PCAPY. This pilot program, funded solely out of the State
treasury and without federal reimbursement, authorized
grants to qualified medical providers for the provision of prena-
tal care to women with family incomes at or below 185% of
federal poverty line. The program was restrictive both geo-
graphically, because it did not cover all areas of the state, and
substantively, because it excluded delivery, labor, abortion and
postpartum services.' °
New York replaced the pilot program in 1989"' to
participate in the federal PCAP program and to take advan-
tage of designated federal funds."2 The new program also au-
thorized the Commissioner of Health to provide grants of State
funds to prenatal care service providers.' Several changes
were made in 1989. First, PCAP became a state-wide entitle-
ment program for women and infants.' Second, the program
became funded and administered through the state Medicaid
program.'
New York's PCAP now offers the maximum coverage al-
lowed under federal reimbursement standards and includes
women with incomes at or below 100% to 185% of the federal
poverty line. 6 Thus, a single pregnant women with an annual
income between $9,840 and $18,204 is eligible.37 PCAP imme-
2 Prenatal Care Act of 1987, ch. 822, 1987 N.Y. LAWS 1542 (codified in N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2520 et seq.) (McKinney 1987)) (hereinafter "Prenatal Care
Act of 1987").
" Complaint, Appendix 59, at 82, Hope v. Perales, 189 AD.2d 287, 595
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1993) (No. 90-21073), rev'd, 83 N.Y.2d 563, 634 NXE.2d
183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994) (hereinafter "Appendix").
"1 Act of July 19, 1989, ch. 584, 1989 N.Y. Laws 1224 (codified at N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2521 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1993) (hereinafter "Act of July 19,
1989").
Hope, 150 Misc.2d at 988, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
Prenatal Care Act of 1987, ch. 822, supra note 29.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
See Act of July 19, 1989, supra note 31; N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(4)(n),
(o); Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572 n.2, 634 N.E.2d at 185 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813 n.2.
Hope, 185 Misc.2d at 986, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 973. The state's decision to enact
PCAP was based on studies that documented the correlation between infant mor-
tality and neurological abnormalities on the one hand, and low birthweight and
premature births on the other. These conditions are ameliorated by proper care
throughout the pregnancy. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 N..2d at 185, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 814 (citations omitted).
Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2520 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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diately presumes a woman's eligibility upon a preliminary
showing that her household income falls within this income
range.' Unlike Medicaid, this program does not require that
she first exhaust her resources3
PCAP does not fund medically necessary abortions even
though it covers a long and extensive list of pregnancy-related
services." Nor does the state fund abortions necessary to save
the mother's life, even though these are reimbursable under
the federal program." Largely as a result of legislative com-
promise and opposition from anti-choice legislators, PCAP is
the only health care program in the state which specifically
denies abortions to its clients. The state justifies this exclu-
sion by explaining that eligible women can fund their own
3 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521[3], N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 366[4](0)(2)
(McKinney 1992)..
9N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366a[2] (Mc~lnney 1992). A Medicaid recipient must,
upon verification, show exhaustion of resources before his or her application is ap-
proved. The discrepancy between the two programs' requirements is due to the
exigencies attendant upon prenatal care. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 N.E.2d at
185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
"These services include: prenatal risk assessment, prenatal care visits, labora.
tory services, parental health education, referrals for pediatric care and nutritional
services, mental health and related social services, transportation to and, from ap-
pointments, labor and delivery, post-pregnancy services such as family planning,
in-patient care, dental services, emergency room services, home care and
pharmaceuticals. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522(I)(a)-(o) (Mcinney 1993); Hope,
83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 NE.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
1 Complaint, Appendix, supra note 30, at 83. The New York State Supreme
Court stated that a woman is not entitled to funds under PCAP for an abortion
even if necessary to save her life. Hope, 150 Misc. 2d. at 990, 571 N.YS.2d at
976. The program also fails to fund abortions resulting from rape or incest.
"James Dao, Lawyer Takes Aborton-Rights Case to Top Albany Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1994, at B5; Maureen Fan, Abortion Rule Upheld in N.Y.,
NEWSDAY, May 6, 1994, at A6. See also Philip Gates, Fight ouer Abortion Stalls
Prenatal Care, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1989, at B3. For three consecutive yearv, a
dispute between the Republican-controfled Senate and Democrat-controlled Assem-
bly over abortion funding blocked the expansion of PCAP. 'The Democrat Assembly
refuse[d] to consider bills that would change th[e] traditions [of Medicaid funding
for abortions]. The Republican Senate, though, will not discuss legislation that
does not exclude Medicaid-funding abortions for newly-eligible. Id.; ece also Philip
Gates, Albany Pace on Prenatal Care Excludes Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1989 at B2. Initially, "[tihe Assembly... had refused to approve the program
unless the state agreed to pay for abortions for the newly-eligible women." Finally,
a three-year deadlock ended when the Assembly passed the legislation excluding
abortion coverage. Assembly Speaker Mel Miller explained the Assembly's change
in position: [A]lthough most of my conference would favor that abortions be paid
for under this program, ... they feel the program is so important that it must be
approved." Id.
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abortions.4 3 Moreover, these women are still able to receive all
of the other covered pregnancy and post-pregnancy services up
to sixty days after their pregnancies have been terminated, re-
gardless of how they ended their pregnancies.44
II. HOPE V. PERALES, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
A. Facts
"Hope" was a 19 year-old pregnant woman who worked
forty-four hours a week while attending college at night.45 She
had qualified for PCAP because her salary was below 185% of
the federal poverty line.46 After Hope tested positive for preg-
nancy, her doctor informed her that because she is a carrier of
sickle cell anemia, 4 an abortion would be medically necessary
' The New York Court of Appeals based its holding on this assumption. Hope,
83 N.Y.2d at 577, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816, 634 N.E.2d at 188.
" Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813; see N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521(3) and N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 365.a(5)(b). New York
continues to include funding for abortions in its Medicaid program even though
the United States Supreme Court ruled that exclusion is not unconstitutional. See,
e.g., In re City of New York v. Wyman, 66 Misc.2d 402, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup.Ct.
N.Y. County), rev'd, 37 A.D.2d 700, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1st Dep't 1971), rev'd, 30
N.Y.2d 537, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385, 281 (1972), and infra notes 247-253 and accompa-
nying text.
' Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978. Another plaintiff, Jane Moo,
also was income eligible but was not pregnant. She carried a fatal genetic defect
that would compel her to have an abortion if she became pregnant. Hope, 83
N.Y.2d at 574, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 994, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 979. Ironically, had Hope quit
her job or taken one that paid less money, she then would have been entitled to
receive funding for an abortion under Medicaid. Transcript of Proceedings before
Honorable Edward J. Greenfield, Appendix, supra note 30, at 307-08.
, Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 987, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974. Sickle cell anemia is an
inherited, chronic, and usually fatal anemia that is marked by crescent.shaped red
blood cells. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DIcTIONARY 1676 (3d ed. 1992) The disease
is characterized by episodic pain in the joints, fever, leg ulcers, and jaundice and
is caused by a recessive gene. Id. It occurs almost exclusively in black people of
Africa or African descent. Id. Allan Rosenfield, M.D., Professor of Obstetrics-Gyne-
cology and Public Health and head of the Population and Family Health division
at Columbia University School of Public Health, testified that pregnancy acceler-
ates the clinical course of sickle cell anemia and causes more frequent medical
crises in women who suffer from this disease. Affidavit of Allan Rosenfield, Appen-
dix 164, supra note 30, at 171. For example, women infected with sickle cell ane-
mia experience more frequent and more severe infections such as pneumonia, con-
gestive heart failure, and pulmonary complications such as embolus. Id. Addition-
ally, Dr. Allan stated that pre-eclampsia is seen in as many as one-third of preg-
1480 [Vol. 61: 1473
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to protect her health. Hope could not afford to pay the $900
abortion fee on her salary of $230 a week." Hope then left
school so that she could work more and save money for the
abortion.49 Unfortunately, four weeks later, twenty-one weeks
into her pregnancy, the cost of the abortion increased to $1000-
$1500.' Despite saving for four weeks and borrowing from
friends, Hope still did not have the resources to pay for an
abortion-even though her doctor advised her that the proce-
dure would be necessary to preserve her health.1
Hope and Jane Moe, 52 on behalf of all income eligible
women who might require a medically necessary abortion,
along with physicians and various health care organizations,
commenced a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the constitutionality of the PCAP.' The plaintiffs
claimed that PCAP was facially unconstitutional and violated
the Due Process clause of the state constitution. They ar-
gued that since the right of reproductive choice was fundamen-
tal under the Due Process clause's right to privacy, any in-
fringement upon this right was subject to strict scrutiny.
The plaintiffs demonstrated that PCAP burdened the funda-
mental right to reproductive choice by coercing women into
childbirth. 6 The plaintiffs explained that the program is dis-
criminatory because it only funds one of two courses of conduct
nant women who suffer from the disease. Id. Finally, perinatal mortality and
spontaneous abortion are also common in women carrying this trait. Id.
' Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 574, 634 NZE.2d at 186, 611 N.YS.2d at 814. Hope testi-
fied that her monthly expenditures included: $267 for rent; $270 for food; 80-100
for her share of the utilities (phone bill only because her parents pay gas and
electric in exchange); $38 for car insurance; and $68 for gas. Affidavit of Jane
Hope, Appendix 97, supra note 30, at 98 (hereinafter "Hope Aff.").
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
6 Id. An abortion in New York costs between $200 and $3,500 depending on
the facility and the stage in pregnancy. Id.
81 Id at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978-79.
2 Jane Moe was not pregnant at the time but would have required an abor-
tion if she became pregnant because she is a carrier of the fatal chromosomal
abnormality, Trisomy 13. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 NE..2d at 185-86, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813-14.
u N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of the law."
" Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents at 49, Hope v. Porales, 83 N.Y.2d, 634
N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994) (No. 23) (hereinafter "Plaintif' Brief).
I Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
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possible in pregnancy."7 This selective funding scheme, plain-
tiffs argued, effectively takes the decision away from women
and therefore improperly interferes with their right to
choose. 8 Since the state conditions funding on the result it
desires--childbirth-this impermissibly pressures low income
women into carrying to term and leaves women without any
real choice regarding their pregnancy. The state's discriminato-
ry funding scheme therefore infringed upon a constitutional
right and was subject to the highest level of review under the
constitution.
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to prove
that the program withstood strict scrutiny analysis for two
reasons. 9 First, they contended that the defendant's failed to
put forth a compelling state interest because the state's inter-
est in childbirth cannot override a woman's fundamental right
to choose. 0 Second, they argued that the program bears no
relation to the goal of ensuring the delivery of healthy babies
by those women who carry to term.61
Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that PCAP violated
the Equal Protection clause62 because the conduct-oriented
program does not meet the clause's guarantee that state bene-
fits will be extended equally.' The Equal Protection clause
guarantees equal participation in a state benefit once the bene-
fit is extended.' Here, the state intruded upon a fundamental
right by refusing to extend the benefit of state funding simply
because some women choose to exercise a fundamental right.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 575-76, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 55, at 48.
'0 Id.
"1 Id. at 50.
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. "No person shall, because of race, color, creed, or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person
or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or [any] agency or sub.
division of the state." Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 998, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981. Plaintiffs
also argued that the program violates the freedom of religion clause, Article I, § 3,
Aid to Needy, N.Y. CONST. art. 17, § 1, Health of Inhabitants, N.Y. CONST. art.
17, § 3. Although the Supreme Court of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
on the Aid to Needy claim, Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980, the
appellate division rejected both challenges. Hope, 189 AJD.2d at 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d
at 954. These challenges will not be discussed in this Comment.
' Affirmation of Robert M. Levy, Appendix 51, supra note 30, at 54; Plaintiffs'
Brief, supra note 55, at 54.
" Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
1482 [Vol. 61: 1473
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Plaintiffs asserted this distinction triggered the "strict scruti-
ny" standard of review because the program's funding scheme
burdened a fundamental right.' As in due process, strict
scrutiny applies when a law has a discriminatory impact upon
a fimdamental right.' The plaintiffs argued that PCAP dis-
criminated between those for whom medical care is necessary
for childbirth and those for whom an abortion is medically
necessary.'7 The state failed to meet this stringent standard
because New York lacked a compelling interest to justify the
distinction between these women.' The program thus violat-
ed equal protection.69
The plaintiffs sued both the Commissioners of the New
York State Department of Social Services and the Department
of Health-the directors of the agencies responsible for admin-
istering the PCAP and promulgating the relevant guidelines.70
The defendants' position was that the legislature's decision to
enhance access to prenatal care did not impair the ability of
women, whatever their income level, to procure abortions.71
Therefore, because the program did not affect a woman's right
to choose abortion, the program was constitutional. 2
Specifically, the defendants argued that the state had
expanded PCAP to remedy a special, significant problem-the
detrimental effects on infants' health caused by a lack of pre-
natal care7 New York State argued that it had a strong in-
terest in providing access to prenatal and obstetrics care to
women who are too poor to get these services. The defendants
further asserted that PCAP's funding scheme, which provided
pregnancy-related and childbirth expenses but not abortion,
also was narrowly tailored, because this scheme achieved its
"A statute that burdens a fundamental right or discriminates against a sus-
pect class must be struck down unless it satisfies the strict cc-utiny standard of
review. Under this test, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling interest. In re Rosenstock v. Scaringe, 40 N.Y.2d 563, 357 Nx2d 347, 388
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976).
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 98L
Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 55, at 56.
Plaintiffs Brief; supra note 55, at 56.
Plaintiffs Brief; supra note 55, at 56.
o Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 987, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
n Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
SId- at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
73 Id,
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ends of promoting the health of newborns.74 Funding birth
and not abortion, according to the defendants, did not discrimi-
nate against nor deprive women of their right to choose be-
cause women could still afford to have an abortion. 5 The de-
fendants relied on the legislative presumption that the women
who receive PCAP and therefore are above the poverty line
would have the resources to enable them to afford an abor-
tion.7 6 PCAP, in their view, was merely a "one step at a time"
approach to ameliorating infant mortality rates.7 Thus, the
defense concluded that the legislature's decision to finance
medical services that aimed to improve the health of infants
did not infringe upon nor even meaningfully relate to a
woman's right to abortion.78
B. The Courts' Decisions
1. The Supreme Court of New York
The Supreme Court of New York held for the plaintiffs
and ruled that PCAP violated the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection clauses of the state constitution because its selective,
conduct-oriented financing scheme interfered with a woman's
fundamental right to abortion.79 As the court wrote, a
"woman's decision to bear a child transforms her body, risks
her health and changes her life... [thus] [hier right to make
this decision free from government interference lies at the
heart of the right to privacy secured by the Due Process clause
in the New York State Constitution." °
The Supreme Court found that PCAP interferes with this
7, Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 989, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
" Hope, 189 AJD.2d 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
7' Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 989-90, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
' Id. at 989, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
78 Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
" Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 995, 999, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979, 982. The supreme
court held that abortion is protected as a fundamental right under the state con-
stitution. Id. at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979. The court stated, "It is an eligible
woman's exercise of the fundamental right to abortion which triggers POAP's un-
constitutional restriction." Id. See also In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d 145, 538 N.Y.S.2d
274 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 705, 736 N.E.2d 627, 539 N.Y.S.2d 298
(1989) (court implicitly held abortion is fundamental right).
8o Spencer, supra note 2, at 2.
1484 [Vol. 61, 1473
19951 ABORTION RIGHTS UNDER NEW YORE STATE CONSTITUTION 1485
fundamental right by impermissibly pressuring PCAP-eligible
poor women toward childbirth."1 As noted, although PCAP
provided medical assistance for all services related to pregnan-
cy and childbirth-including prenatal risk assessment and
laboratory services to detect fetal abnormalities-it did and
does not fund abortion. The court stated that a medical assis-
tance program that conditions assistance on the state-preferred
choice of childbirth "effectively precludes an eligible woman
from any real choice in the fundamental decision 'to bear or
beget a child.'"8 2 Therefore, PCAP violated the Due Process
clause of the state constitution.
The court also held that PAP's abridgment of a funda-
mental rights failed even the lowest level of scrutiny under
the court's equal protection analysis.' Because PCAP ignored
the effects on maternal health and the probability of grave
infant defects that would result if women could not receive
abortions, the court held that PCAP was not rationally related
to the state's goal of promoting infant and maternal health.
The court recognized that there is no constitutional require-
ment for a state to accord equal treatment to both abortion and
childbirths but found it "inconsistent and even irreconcilable
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
Id. at 995-96, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979 (quoting Cary v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977)).
, See id. at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978 ('The right of a pregnant woman to
choose abortion in circumstances where it is medically indicated is one component
of the right to privacy ... '). See also id. at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979 ("It is an
eligible woman's exercise of the fundamental right to abortion which triggers
PCAP's unconstitutional restriction.").
e' There are two levels of review when a statute is challenged on nonprocedur-
al grounds as violating due process and three levels under equal protection analy-
sis. Strict scrutiny, which applies to fundamental rights and suspect classifications,
requires that the statute be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state inter-
est. Golden v. Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 623, 564 N..2d 611, 613-14, 563 N.Y.S.2d 1,
3-4 (1990). If a fundamental right is not infringed, then the inquiry is whether
there is some reasonable relation between the statute and a legitimate state inter-
est. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Montgomery v.
Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54, 340 N.E.2d 444, 451, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 11 (1975). Under
equal protection analysis, certain classifications, such as gender and illegitimacy,
are reviewed under a third level of review--the intermediate level of scrutiny. City
of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Hope, because
PCAP could not even satisfy the lowest level of scrutiny, the trial court did not
analyze it under the higher level.
' Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 996, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 470 (1977)).
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to find that a State-sponsored aid program providing prenatal
services furthers, at best, a 'compelling' or at least, an
'important', State interest when certain eligible recipients are
denied assistance in spite of their medical condition."'86
The court concluded that the program was not designed to
ensure that eligible women received the most appropriate med-
ical assistance and therefore failed the second prong of due
process and equal protection analysis. On the contrary, the
program ignored the risks to a mother's health and the proba-
bility of grave fetal defects by excluding medically necessary
abortions. This policy left at-risk women with no alternative
but to give birth despite medically diagnosed dangers. 7 Thus,
the program actually based assistance on conduct, and not
medical need as the state asserted. If Hope gave birth, the
state would have funded all of the expenses; if she elected to
have an abortion to protect her own health, the state would
have refused to assist her even though it was a medically nec-
essary procedure. Because its very design disregarded the
danger to both mother and baby, PCAP was facially deficient
since it could not fulfill its stated objective of enhancing mater-
nal and fetal health.' PCAP does not withstand the lowest
level of scrutiny under the due process and equal protection
clauses. The result, that both the mother and the baby would
be sick, was not "fairly, justly, rationally or reasonably related
to combating infant mortality or low birth weight." 9 More-
over, these medical conditions would lead to more costly treat-
ment for both mother and child." The court therefore conclud-
ed that there was no justification for the funding scheme's in-
fringement upon the exercise of an eligible woman's fundamen-
tal right to choose abortion.91
"Id.
, Id. at 990, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
Id. at 994-95, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Id. at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
Hope testified that she "[could not] afford to raise a baby on [her] own" and
if the baby was afflicted with sickle cell anemia, she "[could not] care for a sick
baby all alone." Hope Aff., supra note 48, at 99.
" Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 996-97, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
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2. The Appellate Division of New York
In a 4-1 ruling, the New York Appellate Division affirmed
the lower court ruling and agreed that PCAP infringed upon a
woman's right to reproductive freedom, a part of the funda-
mental right to privacy protected by the state's Due Process
clause.' The court agreed with the trial court's invalidation of
PCAP because it also found that PCAP unconstitutionally
discriminated against
women's right to reproductive freedom, which is part of the funda-
mental right to privacy protected by the Due Process Clause... of
the New York State Constitution [and held that] the right of a preg-
nant woman to choose abortion in circumstances where it is medical-
ly indicated is one component of the right of privacy2P
The Appellate Division agreed with the Supreme Court
that the scheme was unconstitutional because it "uncondition-
ally bases assistance on conduct rather than need.' This dis-
crepancy impermissibly steered women toward childbirth by
paying for all the expenses incurred in childbirth and none of
those associated with abortion." The effect of a policy which
only funds childbirth is "certain[ ] to pressure women in the di-
rection of giving birth 9  and 'has the effect of forcing needy
women to give birth even when this is not medically indicated
and is detrimental to their physical and mental well-being.'
The court rejected the defendant's argument, finding it "ex-
tremely facile" to claim that PCAP-eligible women still could
procure an abortion when poor women frequently lack the
Hope, 189 AJ).2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954 ("the Due Process Clause of
the State Constitution ... encompasses the right to reproductive choice which is
an integral part of the right to privacy and bodily autonomy). The dissent also
recognized that, 'lilndeed, it may even be coneed, as the plaintiffis argue, that
the protections afforded in the subject area by the State Constitution exceed those
of the Federal Constitution: that the right of reproductive choice is fundamental
under the State Constitution ... ." Id. at 298-99, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 955 (Murphy,
J., dissenting).
Id, at 292, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
Id, at 292, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
' I&
Id. at 293-94, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
Hope, 189 A.).2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
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means to pay for the procedure on their own.98 PCAP thus
conflicted with the "requirement that government actions must
be constitutionally neutral in affecting the exercise of funda-
mental rights."9' For this reason, the appellate division con-
cluded that the "only logical explanation for the discriminatory
funding scheme implemented by the Legislature when it adopt-
ed PCAP... was that a majority of that body was endeavoring
to avoid the political pitfalls accompanying anything even
remotely connected to the subject of abortion."0 0
3. The New York Court of Appeals
In a surprising decision, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the lower courts' rulings and held that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish that PCAP even indirectly infringed
upon their right to reproductive choice.01 The court claimed
no evidence indicated that women are "coerced, pressured,
steered or induced by PCAP to carry pregnancies to term,
"
and therefore plaintiffs failed to show a burden on a funda-
mental right. The court, contrary to the two lower courts, ac-
cepted the defendant's claim that PCAP is rationally related to
its goal of ameliorating infant mortality and morbidity rates by
providing prenatal care to low-income women.10 3 Consequent-
ly, the court upheld PCAP under both the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses.0 4
The court of appeals placed great emphasis on its per-
ceived distinction between Medicaid-eligible women and PCAP-
eligible women. Indeed, this differentiation provided the basis
of its reasoning. The court acknowledged that New York had a
long-standing commitment to fund abortions for poor women
under the Medicaid program because for these women, abor-
98 Id. at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
9 Id. at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953; see also Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 995, 571
N.Y.S.2d at 979 (while the legislature can express a preference for childbirth over
abortion and allocate resources accordingly, it cannot "transgress constitutional
principles to achieve this result").
o Hope, 189 AJD.2d at 297, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
'o' Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 576, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
102 Id.
1- Id. at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
104 Id. at 577, 634 NE.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
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tion would arguably be foreclosed by a lack of resources. 5
The court found no evidence on the record that rebutted the
legislature's presumption that a woman who is slightly above
the Medicaid line has the financial means to exercise her fun-
damental right to choice.' The court justified its reliance on
this presumption by pointing out that PCAP-eligible women do
not ordinarily receive state assistance. Because these women
presumably could still afford an abortion from their own re-
sources, the court concluded POAPs scheme of only funding
childbirth did not impose any direct burden on abortion, nor
did it make abortion any less accessible or less affordable for
these women.0 7 Based on this reasoning, the court rejected
the argument that merely subsidizing certain prenatal services
while excluding others itself constituted coercion. It found no
other evidence that this lack of subsidization influenced POAP
women to carry to term. 0 8 According to the court, the pro-
gram actually made abortion even more affordable because of
the free testing and sixty-day postpartum care." PCAP was
therefore constitutional under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses.
III. THE MISSTATEMENT OF THE RECORD: How THE COURT
AVOIDED IMPORTANT ISSUES
The New York Court of Appeals appears to have intention-
ally misconstrued the trial transcript in order to avoid address-
ing crucial legal issues presented in Hope. The court's opinion
betrayed two assumptions that were inconsistent with the
record to reach its conclusion. First, it relied upon the
legislature's presumption that PCAP-eligible women can afford
abortions on their own despite an abundance of evidence sub-
mitted by plaintiffs contradicting this premise."' Second, the
court limited the scope of PCAP's objectives solely to combat-
ting the state's "unacceptably high rate of low birthweight and
infant mortality.""' The court ignored evidence indicating
Ao' Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 576, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id. at 575, 634 NB..2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id. at 577, 634 N3..2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
'1o Id. See infra notes 115-159 and accompanying text.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 NE.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813. Sce infra
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that the legislature enacted PCAP to prevent maternal as well
as infant mortality and morbidity. Because of its selective
reading of the record, the court was able to reach the conclu-
sion that PCAP's funding of prenatal care is rationally related
to a legitimate state objective." 2 By claiming that PCAP
was not a general medical program and by distinguishing
PCAP-eligible women from Medicaid-eligible women, the court
limited the scope of the program. Thus, it avoided having to
answer the "Medicaid question"-whether the state
constitution affords greater protection than the federal
constitution in terms of abortion rights-and having to take
into account what was in the best medical interest for these
women. 113
A. PCAP-Eligible Women's Difficulty In Affording Abortions
On Their Own
The New York Court of Appeals distinguished women in
PCAP's income category from Medicaid-eligible women whose
"option to choose an abortion is arguably foreclosed by her lack
of resources.""' The court inaccurately stated that the legis-
lative presumption that PCAP-eligible women are able to af-
ford an abortion on their own was "not rebutted on the record
before [it].""' Based on this initial conclusion, the court rea-
soned that "[there is no evidence that eligible women are co-
erced, pressured, steered or induced by PCAP to carry their
pregnancies to term."'
The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact
that the plaintiffs submitted numerous affidavits establishing
notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
1 Id. at 577, 634 NE.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
1 Because the New York legislature continuously has funded abortion in its
general Medicaid plan, the court of appeals has never been confronted with the
issue as to whether the state constitution mandates the inclusion of abortion in a
general medical plan. See Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 992, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 977. This
Comment argues that the court of appeals avoided this issue when it distinguished
Medicaid-eligible from PCAP-eligible women. In both situations, however, women
often cannot afford to pay for an abortion. See infra notes 115-159 and accompany-
ing text.
"i Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
n" Id. at 575, 634 NE.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
n' Id. at 576, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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that PCAP-ehgible women often cannot afford to pay indepen-
dently for abortions."7 The trial court recognized this show-
ing when it rejected the defendants' contention that PCAP-
eligible women were able to afford an abortion. Both the evi-
dence submitted at trial, and the fact that the legislature en-
acted PCAP precisely to cover these women whom it believed
needed financial assistance with prenatal and post-natal ex-
penses, supports the lower court's finding of fact."'
The plaintiffs submitted numerous expert affidavits to the
trial court that documented the hardship and significant chal-
lenge PCAP women encounter when attempting to save for an
abortion in the absence of government assistance. William H.
Scarbrough, Ph.D.," 9  a poverty expert, and Stanley .
Henshaw, Ph.D.,=° one of the country's leading statisticians
n? See infra notes 119-133, 137-159 and accompanying text If the court had
accepted the testimony that PCAP-eligible women cannot afford to pay for an
abortion, it would have been confronted with the argument accepted by the lower
courts that the funding scheme discriminates against women for whom abortion is
medically necessary, but who cannot afford one, and in favor of women who seek
medical care for childbirth. Hope, 150 fisc.2d at 996-97, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980. See
Right to Choose v. Bryne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982). The argument accepted
by the supreme court and appellate division was that medical care is required by
virtue of pregnancy. To condition medical assistance on the result desired by the
state and not on the medical necessity of the pregnant woman effectively wrests
control over her body and health from her and takes the choice away from her.
The state simply cannot wield its enormous economic power to influence a woman
to choose birth, particularly when it could be fatal to her. Hope, 150 M-sc. 2d at
997, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
US See infra notes 119-160. See also Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 296-97, 595 N.Y.S.2d
at 953. See also Governors Memorandum on Approval of Ci. 584, N.Y. Laws (July
19, 1989) reprinted in [1989] N.Y. Laws Gm-60 (McKinney) ("Approximately 28,000
women and 40,000 infants, who would not otherwise receive appropriate medical
care, now will have access to necessary care.").
"' Dr. Scarbrough is Associate Director for Research at the National Center for
Children in Poverty, a research institute affiliated with the School of Public
Health at Columbia University. He also worked as a senior analyst in the United
States General Accounting Office where he was responsible for planning, imple-
menting and monitoring national studies of public assistance programs, and for
developing federal statistical policy. Affidavit of William H. Scarbrough, Appendix,
supra note 30, at 191 (hereinafter "Scarbrough Af.").
11 Deputy Director of Research for the Alan Guttmacher Institute ("AG) in
New York City, an independent, nonprofit corporation involved in research, policy
analysis and public education in reproductive health care. AGI statistics have been
accepted by the Census Bureau as the most complete statistics on abortion in the
United States and are published each year in the Statistical Abstract of the United
States. Affidavit of Stanley K. Henshaw, Appendix 133, cupra note 30, at 133
(hereinafter "Henshaw Af.").
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in reproductive health care, both testified that the statutory
exclusion irreparably harms pregnant women in the PCAP in-
come category who need an abortion but cannot afford to pay
independently for medical care.'2 ' Dr. Scarbrough found that
these women, many of whom were minority and teenaged
mothers when they had given birth to their first child, often
could not provide basic necessities for their families." In rec-
ognition of their plight, the federal government had extended
various entitlement programs to these families, such as food
stamps and federal housing subsidies, because those women
"could not otherwise afford the subsidized goods and servic-
es."" Therefore, in Dr. Scarbrough's opinion, PCAP-eligible
women are poor, "insofar as poverty means the inability to
afford the basic necessities of life, such as medical treat-
ment.
22
Dr. Henshaw also testified that women often have a dif-
ficult time saving for an abortion, which sometimes represents
30 weeks of their earnings."2 In New York, women eligible
under PCAP earn between $499 and $921 a month,1 26 or on
the average, $1,500 a month for a family of three."2 After
paying 40% to rent and utility bills (higher in the Northeast
than the national average), 25% to childcare, (again, 20% more
expensive in the Northeast) and 20% to federal, state, and
local taxes, the woman heading a family of three would be left
" Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 193. See generally Appendix, supra note
30, at 192-98. See also Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 135.
2 Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 193. Because Dr. Scarbrough did not
know of any state studies of this income range, his conclusions were based on
national demographics of families with incomes between 100% and 185% of the
federal poverty line.
' Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 194. Families with gross incomes up to
130% of the poverty line qualify for food stamps, 7 C.F.R. § 273.9 (1988), and
families with incomes up to 80% of the median family income (an income slightly
higher than 100% of the federal poverty line) are eligible for federal housing subsi-
dies. Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 194 (citing P.A. Leonard, C.N. Dolbear, &
E.B. Lazere, A Place to Call Home: The Crisis in Housing for the Poor, Washing-
ton, D.C., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (1989)).
1 Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 198.
125 Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 139.
126 Brief Amicus Curiae of the City of New York at 11, Hope v. Perales, 150
Misc. 2d 985, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991) (No. 21073/90) (here-
inafter "City Brief').
,2 Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 195.
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with approximately 10%-or $150-per month.' The re-
maining money must cover the essentials of every day
life-food, clothing, and transportation. Many of these women,
who are "only a few steps away from homelessness and pover-
ty,"' do not have savings or private health insurance."
An abortion in New York State, excluding the expenses of
child care, loss of salary, transportation and other less tangible
expenditures, costs between $200 and $3,500 depending on the
stage in pregnancy and type of facility."1 In some cases, this
cost can equal from two-thirds to over one hundred percent of
the woman's total public assistance payments.2 For a single
woman whose income is between one hundred and one hun-
dred eighty-five percent of the federal poverty line, the cost
represents between one to thirty weeks' earnings."
Women who do manage to scrape together the money for
an abortion must divert funds from living necessities. This
leads to severe hardship. Medicaid recipients, for example,
have reported that to meet the cost of an abortion, they had to
use money earmarked for other family essentials like children's
expenses, food, bill payments, and transportation, clothing and
" Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 195-96.
City Brief supra note 126, at 11.
=" Scarbrough Aff., supra note 119, at 196 (approximately 437 of all families in
the 100-185% federal poverty level have no private medical insurane).
"2 Appendix, supra note 30, at 197; Cost Implication, supra note 24, at 2
(average cost of early, outpatient abortion is $250).
' See City Brief, supra note 126, at 11; Cost Implication, supra note 24, at 2.
The average monthly maximum in AFDC payments to a family of three in 27
states is estimated to be $250. Moreover, in nine states, the cost of an early term
abortion is higher than families' entire monthly payments. Cwst Implications, supra
note 24, at 2.
1 Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 139. See also Affidavit of Josephine Rose,
Appendix, supra note 30, at 286-90. Dr. Henshaw testified that the exclusion of
abortion from PCAP harms women who cannot afford but require an abortion.
Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 287. For women who do not live near a city
that provides subsidized abortions, the cost of transportation and overnight stay
may preclude women altogether from obtaining a necessary abortion. A PCAP-
eligible woman in Auburn, New York, for example, would have to pay between
$30.90 and $100.70 for transportation to Buffalo, Rochester, or New York City; the
cost of the second trimester abortion in a city costs $350-$1,000; a vonogam
which may be requirel to determine the duration of the pregnancy costs between
$50-$225.00. Thus, the total cost often exceeds one month's salary. Furthermore, if
the woman has a medical problem necessitating hospital supervision for an abor-
tion, the cost is even higher. Some women have continued their pregnancies be-
cause they cannot afford these costs. Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 288.89.
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utility bills."' Others may resort to even more drastic mea-
sures, such as forging insurance claims or even stealing the
money." Thus, these women lack basic Medicaid coverage,
which includes abortion services. Women often face problems
in finding a facility that will perform the procedure. More and
more doctors and hospitals are not willing to perform abor-
tions." 6 Women in more remote areas of the state simply do
not have access to abortion facilities. Nor do they have ade-
quate access to a public facility in New York City,'37 that
" Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion
Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP., 170, 178-79 (July/Aug. 1984). See also
Janice Steinschneider, State Constitutions: The New Battlefield for Abortion Rights,
10 HARV. WOMAEN'S L.J. 284, 286 n.10 (1987).
,' Women's Health Servs., Inc. v. Maher, 482 F. Supp. 725, 731 n.9 (D. Conn.)
(1980). Of the 63% that did obtain funds for abortions in this case, many did so
only with some sacrifice of not paying rent or utility bills, pawning household
goods, diverting food and clothing money, journeying to another state to obtain
lower rates, or fraudulently using a relative's insurance policy. In a few cases,
some patients were desperate enough to steal money to fund their abortions. Id.
" There has been a significant decline in the number of doctors who are will.
ing to perform the procedure. In part, the decreasing number of doctors is due to
tactics by anti-abortion extremists who picket doctors' homes, make death threats,
and put doctors' photographs and addresses on wanted posters. Tessa Souter, Stop
Tactics, THE GUARDIAN, May 9, 1994, at T010. Abortion clinics throughout the
country have been the target of arson, bombing, vandalism and abusive picketing
leading to the passage of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act. Id. These
tactics have been successful. The number of abortion providers in rural states has
decreased by 51% since 1977 and by 6% in urban areas. Id. More astonishing is
that a staggering 83% of all United State counties do not have a single abortion
provider. Id.
"1 The Executive Vice President of Planned Parenthood of New York City
("PPNYC"), testified that PPNYC patients who cannot afford to pay for an abortion
but are able to obtain an abortion at a municipal hospital are forced to wait ap-
proximately four to five weeks. Affidavit of Joan S. Coombs, Appendix 236, supra
note 15, at 243. This delay is in contrast to the one- to two-day delay for Medic-
aid-eligible women. Id. at 239. See also Affidavit of Vicki Alexander, M.D., Appen-
dix, supra note 30, at 221. Dr. Alexander, Medical Director of Community Family
Planning Council ("CFPC"), and former staff physician at Maternal-Infant Care-
Family Planning Projects, testified that women in the
100-185% income category . . . often cannot be served [at private abor-
tion facilities] because they cannot pay the fee. The price of the abortion
at these clinics range from $235-$1,000 depending on the duration of
the pregnancy. Few patients in the 100-185% income category can raise
even the lowest of these sums in the short time available before the
price beings to climb as the pregnancy advances.
Id. at 224.
Dr. E. Hakin Elahi, Director of Ambulatory Care and Assistant Professor at
the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the School of Medicine of the
State University of New York at Stony Brook, and Medical Director of PPNYC,
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subsidizes abortions for PCAP-eligible women, because many
women cannot afford the transportation costs. Moreover, wom-
en who are able to get to a New York City hospital that per-
forms abortions for PCAP-eligible women for free or at a re-
duced cost often face a delay of 3-4 weeks and each week's
delay increases the health risks of the procedure and the trau-
ma associated therewith."s Due to severe overcrowding, in-
flexible schedules and bureaucratic procedural requirements,
many women who would have obtained a first trimester abor-
tion were forced to delay the procedure sometimes up to five
weeks.'39 Too often, these women have no other option but to
carry through with an unwanted birth because they simply
cannot save for an abortion.
Statewide physicians and health care providers who work
with this constituency on a daily basis testified before the New
York Court of Appeals that many women have such a difficulty
testified that based on "extensive clinical experience, personal knowledge and study
of relevant literature and statistical data recognized as reliable in the medical
profession," his professional opinion was that PCAP irreparably harms 'low-income
women who need a pregnancy terminated but cannot afford to pay independently
for medical care. Affidavit of E. Hakin Elahi, MD., Appendix 246, supra note 30,
at 246-47. Many women cannot afford an abortion and therefore delay the proce-
dure in order to obtain money to pay the cost, which is $3,500 at Stony Brook in-
cluding physician's fees, a sonogram, anesthesia, and hospital expenzes. Id. at 247.
Louise Crawley, Director of Erie Medical Center in Buffalo, New York and
former resident nurse in Obstetrics and Gynecology at Buffalo General Hospital,
testified that "many [PCAP-eligible] patients have such severe financial con-
straints," they postpone the procedure in order to raise money, yet know this
increases the cost and complications of the abortion. Affidavit of Louise Crawley,
Appendix 262, supra note 30, at 262, 266. Some women who cannot afford the
procedure or the transportation cost to New York City to obtain a subsidized abor-
ion end up "carrying dangerous pregnancies to term and suffering the attendant
consequences to their health." Id. at 268.
Sharon Collier, counseling supervisor at the Erie Mfedical Center, described
four cases in which PCAP-eligible women were forced to either delay the abortion
to obtain the funds or were forced to carry to term. Affidavit of Sharon Collier,
Appendix 270, supra note 30, at 274-77. Patricia Romeo, Coordinator and Counsel-
or at the Patchogue Center of Planned Parenthood Suffolk County, Inc., testified
that 20-25% of their non-Medicaid patients, nearly all of whom were in the 100-
185% income category, reported serious financial limitations that may delay or pre-
vent them from obtaining an abortion. Id. at 278, 281. She described two typical
examples: one in which an income-eligible woman, because of lack of funding, was
forced to delay a first trimester abortion until the second trimester;, the other in
which the woman was forced to carry to term because she could not afford a sec-
ond trimester abortion. Id. at 284.
Affidavit of Ana 0. Dumois, Appendix 207, supra note 30, at 21L
"' Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 138.
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obtaining funds for an abortion that they either must delay the
procedure or are "forced to continue the pregnancy."140 PCAP-
eligible women often must postpone having an abortion while
they try to raise money. This delay poses two serious problems:
later procedures are more expensive, thereby requiring women
to raise even more money than needed for a first trimester
abortion;"" and delaying an abortion greatly increases the
risk of complications and risks associated with the procedure
and is "wholly inconsistent with sound medical practice."4 4 A
second trimester abortion performed at sixteen to twenty
weeks carries nineteen times greater risk of death than an
abortion performed at eight weeks."4 Other women who are
unable to save the money and cannot get subsidized abortions
140 Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 140 (the exclusion of abortion from PCAP
will force many women in this income category to "delay... into the second
trimester of pregnancy and others will be deterred from obtaining necessary abor-
tions"); see also Affidavit of Irwin H. Kaiser, M.D., Appendix 147, supra note 30,
at 148. A medical doctor and professor emeritus in the Department of Obstetrics
and Gynecology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine of Yeshiva University,
Kaiser testified that the "statutory exclusion causes irreparable and severe harm
in that it operates to delay and in some cases, to prevent the women in the af.
fected income category from obtaining timely, safe abortions." Id. at 148. One
reason is that amniocentesis, the most reliable prenatal diagnostic test, is ideally
performed for this purpose after the 15th week, with test results obtained between
the 19th and the 21st weeks. Id. at 149-50. For many low-income women who
learn later in pregnancy of a genetic abnormality that may cause deformity or
death of the infant, the program's exclusion of abortion leaves many "no real alter-
native but to continue the pregnancy irrespective of the medical, physical, or emo-
tional consequences." Id. at 151. Therefore, although responsible medicine man-
dates that these women obtain an abortion, PCAP's scheme "effectively precludes
most low-income women from obtaining abortions" Id. at 154.
Dr. Ana Dumois, CEO of Community Family Planning Council ("CFPC"), a
nonprofit agency providing comprehensive reproductive health care to the five bor-
oughs of New York City through funding received from the New York City Human
Resources Department, the State Department of Health, United Way, and private
resources, testified that PCAP irreparably harms women in this income range
because they "often cannot raise the money to pay for abortions in private, free-
standing clinics in New York City." Affidavit of Ana 0. Dumois, Appendix 207,
supra note 30, at 210. The price range for abortions is $235-$1,000, which repre-
sents between one-half of a week's to four weeks' earnings. Id. Moreover, these
amounts are "usually unavailable for medical care because the family's income is
almost entirely absorbed by other necessities such as food and shelter." Id.
14 Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 134, at 170-71.
14 Moe v. Secretary of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Mass. 1981).
14 Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 138. Moreover, the tendency of teenagers
to obtain abortions later in pregnancy has the largest single effect on morbidity
and mortality for abortion in this population. Id. (citations omitted).
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"are forced to continue pregnancies.""' The exclusion of abor-
tion from PCAP therefore forces some women to "carry un-
wanted and medically risky pregnancies to term."145
In addition to the expert testimony, Hope and other indi-
vidual women submitted affidavits to the court of appeals
detailing personal accounts of financial inability to pay for an
abortion.46 Jane Moe, for example, testified that in Novem-
ber 1988, she had been forced to continue one pregnancy be-
cause of a lack of money.'47 Although she had earned slightly
above the Medicaid line, her income of $1050 a month had
been insufficient to allow her to save for an abortion that
would have cost $300." At the end of each month, only
$100-250 a month had remained for food, transportation, and
clothing, and she had not had medical insurance."' After her
last pregnancy, she had given birth to twins." One of her
twins was born with trisomyl 13, a fatal chromosomal abnor-
mality, and had died within months."'1 If Jane Moe were to
become pregnant again, the most effective test to determine
whether the fetus would be afiicted with the chromosomal de-
fect would not be available until late in the second trimester.
At that stage in the pregnancy, it would be extremely difficult,
if not impossible for her to afford an abortion that would cost
approximately $1,000."2
I" Henshaw Aff., supra note 120, at 138-40. (The exclusion of abortion from
PCAP will force many women to 'delay ... into the second trimeter of pregnan-
cy and others will be deterred from obtaining necessary abortions.").
I" Id. See also Affidavit of Irwin H. Kaiser, M.ED., Appendix, cupra note 30, at
147-54.
"' See Hope Aff., supra note 44, at 99 (1The clinic ... that will do an abortion
at my stage of pregnancy charges $1500... . The one ... that Planned Parent-
hood referred me to charges $1000. I can't afford either amount."). Sce alco Affi-
davit of Jane Mloe, Appendix 101, supra note 30, at 106 ('1 could never afford to
pay for a later second-trimester procedure on my own.") (hereinafter Woe Aff.").
147 MNoe Aff., supra note 147, at 103.
140 Mloe Aff., supra note 147, at 102-03.
11" Moe Aff., supra note 147, at 102.
is' Moe Aff., supra note 147, at 103.
15 Moe Aff., supra note 147. The baby was born with a severe cleft palate, no
skull bone from the forehead to the back of the neck thus leaving the tissue ex-
posed, extra fingers and toes, and with virtually no immune system. Because the
baby could not eat, she slowly starved to death. Moe Affi, oupra note 147, at 104-
05.5.2 Aoe Aff., supra note 147, at 106. See also Affidavit of Jane Slate, Appendix
678, supra note 30. Her after-tax income was $248 a week. After paying $200 in
rent, $160 a month for food, $215 for child care, $160 for diapers and formula for
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Furthermore, the legislature's enactment of PCAP reflects
a recognition that many PCAP women have an extremely diffi-
cult time affording any pregnancy-related services.'53 By defi-
nition, the legislature selects these women because they can
not afford or do not receive adequate medical services.'M Sev-
eral references in the legislative debate demonstrate that
members were aware of the dire financial status of women
eligible for PCAP. 55
Equally important, the evidence submitted at trial had
convinced the two lower courts that women in the PCAP in-
come category could not afford abortions. The trial court found
as a factual determination 5 ' that women were manipulated
impermissibly by PCAP's funding scheme because they could
not pay independently for an abortion. 57 Likewise, the appel-
her child, $50 for subway transportation, she was left with $281 a month for
clothing, shoes, and medical care for the baby and herself. After finding out that
she was pregnant, she saved $50 a week for four weeks to cover the cost of a
$400 abortion. At this point, the cost increased to $750 because of the pregnancy's
advanced stage. She then borrowed $350 but had no idea how she would ever pay
this money back. Affidavit of Jane Slate, Appendix, supra note 30, at 678-79.
' See Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982 ("women whom the
Legislature has expressly identified as needy in regard to medical care"). See also
infra notes 133-134.
" Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 998, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 981 ("The effect of Chapter 584
[the chapter enacting PCAP] is to deny medical assistance to needy women ...
(emphasis added).
'" New York State Assembly Debate at 9 (June 30, 1989) ("I hope this is only
the beginning and that .. . women in this category receive the full range of bene-
fits, they desperately need them.") (statement of Assemblyperson Marshall); id. at
10 ("[Tjhis is a bill that ... expands prenatal care for those women in the cate-
gory where they desperately need it. They are not poor enough to be eligible for
Medicaid and they are not earning enough to afford good, adequate medical care.")
(statement of Assemblyperson Mayersohn); New York State Senate Debate at 5398
(1980) (This bill will avert "human suffering among so many poor women that
were deprived of the medical services that they needed.") (statement of Senator
Mendez); id. at 5403 ("This bill ... represents an effort to meet the objective of
expanded prenatal care for New York's needy women.") (statement of Senator
Tully).
166 The appellate standard of review for a factual determination is narrow in
scope, and the court of appeals "is without power to review findings of fact if such
findings are supported by evidence in the record." Humphrey v. State, 60 N.Y.2d
742, 743, 457 N.E.2d 767, 768, 469 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (1983); Le Roux v. State,
307 N.Y. 397, 405, 121 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1954) (stating that the "finding of fact
was not reversed by the Appellate Division and, accordingly, being supported by
substantial evidence of record, it is conclusive in this Court."); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 5501(b) (McKinney 1978); N.Y. APPELLATE PRACTICE, § 4.13 (Thomas
Newman ed. 1983).
17 Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979; Memorandum Decision,
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late division held that "[tihe fact is that women who cannot
afford to pay for an abortion, even if one is medically neces-
sary, have no choice. " s Even the defendants did not dispute
this argument and in fact acknowledged that POAP-eligible
women "may face difficulty paying for an abortion."" '
B. The Goals and Scope of PCAP
The court of appeals limited PCAP's scope by determining
that the program merely aims to improve the health of babies.
This determination contradicted evidence submitted at trial
that showed that the legislature was concerned also with
women's health. If the court had recognized that the program
reflects an interest in preserving maternal health and lives, it
likely would have invalidated PCAP under the rational relation
test."° A program that refuses funding for a procedure neces-
sary to save a woman's life fails to advance one of its primary
goals: reducing maternal morbidity.
Appendix 16, supra note 30, at 34:
Plaintiffs have proffered several affidavits documenting the hardships
women in the affected income category like Hope and others similarly
situated encounter in attempting to save for an abortion. Often such
women are either forced to postpone the procedure increasing not only
the medical risk to themselves, but also the cost of the abortion, or to
forego the procedure altogether, jeopardizing their own health. Defendants
do not dispute these facts; indeed they acknowledge that women in the
plaintiff class "may face difficulty paying for an abortion." Now that the
Legislature has singled these women out, their desperation should not be
ignored.
" Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 296, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 953. (Having aclmowledged that
pregnant women with family incomes between 100 and 185 percent of the poverty
level are 'needy' and require help in obtaining pregnancy-related services, the
legislature violated Article XV § 1, as well as Article XVII,§3 ... ).
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
1 o The rational-relation test is the lowest form of scrutiny under both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The test requires that the statute at issue
bear some "fair, just and reasonable connection" between the goal of the law and
the means to achieve it. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54, 340 N.E.2&
444, 451, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 11 (1975). See also Alevy v. Dovnstate Med. Ctr., 39
N.Y.2d 326, 332-33, 348 N.E.2d 537, 542-43, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 87-88 (1976) (tradi-
tional analysis of equal protection is two-tiered: rational relation and strict scruti-
ny). In this case, the New York Supreme Court found that PCAP failed even the
lowest level of scrutiny because PCAPs denial of funding in a situation where the
mother and baby are afflicted with sickle cell anemia is not "'fairly', justly,
'rationally', or 'reasonably' related to combating infant mortality or low birth
weight." Hope, 150 Mlisc. 2d at 995, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
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The plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence indicating
that PCAP's goals were to improve maternal as well as infant
health.'61 First, PCAP provides a wide range of services that
do much more than merely reduce infant mortality; several
services improve the health of the income-eligible mother.
Dental care, mental health counseling, family planning and
clinical aftercare do nothing directly to promote the health of
the infant but do, however, directly improve the health of the
mother.162 Similarly, the postpartum coverage directly bene-
fits the mother's and not the infant's health. 1
63
One of PCAP's three major components requires all PCAP
providers "to offer a full range of services, including.., health
education, care coordination, psychosocial assessment,...
postpartum services, nutrition services, HIV counseling and
testing services and quality assurance."' After the birth, the
'a' See infra notes 162-171.
162 Some services, such as family planning, pharmaceuticals and laboratory fees
cost less than abortion; this rebuts the defense that the legislature excluded the
less expensive abortion procedure while subsidizing other services that are more
costly. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 55, at 46; see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522
((lXc) (laboratory services), (j) (family planning services), (o) (pharmaceuticals)
(McKinney Supp. 1993)).
163 Senate 6397, 1989-1990 Regular Sessions, June 28, 1989, Appendix 400,
supra note 30, at 401. (Ch. 584), Sec. 1, part 1: pregnant women continue to be
eligible for assistance for sixty days after their pregnancy is ended. Section 2
includes (h) post-partum services and (j) post-partun services including family
planning services and (1) dental services. See also Assembly 6343 1989-1990 Regu-
lar Sessions, March 15, 1989, Appendix 395, supra note 30, at 397 (competing bill
with S. 6397 which would have provided under section four that the pregnant
woman and her children would receive the full range of services available under
Medicaid).
164 Prenatal Care Assistance Program, Appendix 413, supra note 30, at 425. See
also New York State Department of Health PCAP Comprehensive Provider Pro.
gram Agreement, Appendix 567, supra note 30, at 582-83. Development of Care
Plan and Coordination of Care included that care be coordinated to "(v) provide to
or refer the pregnant woman for needed services including: ... (b) dental servic-
es; (c) mental health and related social services; . . . (e) home care; ... (vi) pro-
vide for the pregnant woman special tests and services as may be recommended or
required by the STATE when necessary to protect maternal and/or fetal
healthL] . . .counseling and education based on test results." See also id. at 584,
586, Sec. G, Health Education, which includes, inter lia, "(15) family planning;"
id. at 586, Sec. H, Psychosocial Assessment, which includes, "1) screening for so-
cial, economic, psychological and emotional problems; and 2) referral, as appropri-
ate to the needs of the woman or fetus, to the local Department of Social Services,
community mental health resources, support groups, or social/psychological special-
ists;" id. at 586, 588, Sec. I, Prenatal Diagnostic and Treatment Services, "(vii)
postpartum counseling, evaluation and referral to professional care and services, as
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mother receives services that include "identifying any medical,
psychosocial, nutritional, alcohol treatment and drug treat-
ment needs of the mother or infant that are not being met,"
referring the mother to resources available to meet these
needs, assessing family planning needs, and providing precon-
ception counseling.l"e
Secondly, PCAP's annual report lists "reduc[ing] prevent-
able infant and maternal mortality and morbidity in New York
State," under its objectives and goals."c The Governor's
Memorandum in Support of Chapter 584 also explains that the
bill added "other services ... necessary to the birth of a
healthy baby and a healthy recovery by the mother."1  Gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo lauded PCAP's expansion which he be-
lieved would "contribute to the improved health and well-being
of the citizens of New York." "c Furthermore, the legislative
history also indicates that the state designed the program for
maternal well-being as well as infants'. 69 The Memorandum
for Senate Bill 5339 initially proposed by Senator Michael J.
Tully"2 ° described the purpose of PCAP to "expand Medicaid
eligibility for pregnant women, to receive pregnancy related
services ... ."7 The plain language of "pregnancy related
required, to include preconception counseling as appropriate;" id. at 589.90, Sec. J,
ETV Services, "1) routinely provide the pregnant woman with H[V counseling and
education; 2) routinely offer the pregnant woman confidential HIV testing, and 3)
provide the HtIV-positive woman and her newborn infant the following cervices or
make the necessary referrals for these services: (i) management of HI disease; (ii)
psychosocial support; and (iii) case management to assist in coordination of nec-
essary medical, social and addictive services. (emphasis added in all). See also
Stipulation and Order, Dec. 14, 1990, Appendix 691, supra note 30, at 692 (If a
woman terminates her pregnancy by an abortion, she is still entitled to all of the
above services offered to a woman who carries to term.)
"I N.Y.S. Department of Health Prenatal Care Assistance Program Comprehen-
sive Provider Agreement, Appendix 567, supra note 30, at 593, See. M, Postpar-
tum Services, (1); see generally id., (1)46).
" Prenatal Care Assistance Programs, 1989 Annual Report, Appendix 413,
supra note 30, at 424 (emphasis added).
"- Governor's Program Bill 1989--Memorandum, Appendix 388, supra note 30.
"s Governor's Program Bill 1989-Mfemorandum at 389 (In addition, women
and their babies will be guaranteed a more comprehensive service package of
services.").
' See infra note 155.
170 Senator Tully's bill, N.Y. S.6397, later passed the legislature, thus enacting
POAP.
"J Memorandum of Senator Michael J. Tally, Jr., Appendix 393, supra note 30,
at 393.
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services" inherently includes abortion because in every preg-
nancy there are two potential courses of action--childbirth and
abortion. 172 Therefore, if the legislature wanted to limit
PCAP to only those expenses incurred with childbirth, it easily
could have qualified this clause.
IV. How AND WHY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ANSWER
WHETHER ABORTION IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The New York Court of Appeals seems to have ignored
completely the evidence that PCAP's intended goals include
improving maternal as well infant health. To avoid the appear-
ance of violating the principle of stare decisis,7 3 the court
simply refused to address a crucial issue in Hope-whether
abortion was a fundamental right under the state constitution.
In the context of New York's jurisprudence, its traditional
protection of abortion rights and individual liberties, and the
lower courts' affirmation of abortion as a fundamental right,
the court of appeals may have been obligated to interpret New
York's constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitu-
tion.'74 Because several members of the court may not have
been ready to reach this conclusion, the court apparently com-
promised to avoid the issue altogether.
172 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173 Stare decisis is defined as "to stand by that which was decided; rule by
which common law courts 'are slow to interfere with principles announced in the
former decisions and often uphold them even though they would decide otherwise
were the question a new one.'" BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (3d ed. 1991) (quot-
ing Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge I.O.O.F., 156 P.2d 340, 345 (Okla.
1945)). The doctrine is particularly applicable in the field of constitutional law. Id.
(citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 94 (1936)).
', See infra notes 201-219 and accompanying text. PCAP satisfies federal con-
stitutional standards, which do not require states to fund medically necessary
abortion for women who meet the Medicaid guidelines. The guildelines' income
standard is below PCAP's eligibility standard. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 574, 634 NSE.2d
at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977) ("The Constitution imposes no obligation
on the [government] to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent
women . . ."). States, however, may freely interpret their constitutions more broad-
ly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal counterpart.
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citations omitted).
Therefore, states are free to include medically necessary abortions in their Medic-
aid plans although the federal government will not reimburse these costs. Harris,
448 U.S. at 311, n. 16. See infra notes, 264-269.
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If the court had declared that abortion was a fundamental
right under the state constitution, the court would likely have
invalidated PCAP under the strict scrutiny standard."' " To
withstand an attack on either due process or equal protection
grounds under strict scrutiny, a statute must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling state interest."6 In the abor-
tion context, the plaintiffs, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, asserted that abortion is a fundamen-
tal right under the right to privacy founded in the due process
clause. The due process clause prevents states not only from
barring a fundamental right, but it also prevents state interfer-
ence with this right to such an extent that it is the equivalent
of denying the right. The state here was affirmatively blocking
a poor woman from obtaining an abortion that she could not
afford; in practical terms, this policy has the same effect in
discouraging her exercise of a fundamental right that an out-
right denial or criminal sanctions would have had.' While
the state has an important interest in promoting childbirth,
this interest cannot outweigh the "superior interest in the life
and health of the mother."78 PCAP's balance fails the test; by
excluding a procedure that is necessary to preserve the
mother's health, and sometimes her life, in favor of childbirth,
the program inappropriately subordinates the mother's inter-
est. Furthermore, the program must be narrowly tailored to
serve this interest under strict scrutiny analysis. The supreme
court, however, found that PCAP failed the lowest level of
scrutiny because it was not even rationally related to its stated
goal of promoting infant health."9
128 See suprm note 65. Strict scrutiny is applied when a state burdens a funda-
mental right.
128 See supra note 65. See also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 496, 495 N.E.2d
337, 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80 (1986) (due process).
17 Hope, 150 AMisc. 2d at 996, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
17l Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Com-
mittee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Meyers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 1981)
("we ... conclude that the asserted state's interest in protecting a nonviable fetus
is subordinate to the woman's right of privacy."). See alco Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (a state may "'regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preser-
vation of the life or health of the mother.") (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113,
164-65 (1973)).
17 Hope, 150 M isc. 2d at 1000, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 982 ("Indeed, balanced against
the interest of the pregnant woman in choosing a medically necessary abortion,
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First, the court of appeals never addressed whether abor-
tion is a fundamental right under the state constitution.18
The Hope decision was the first since 1972 where the New
York Court of Appeals had been given the opportunity to make
an independent declaration afi ing reproductive rights for
women under the state constitution. If the court had found
abortion to be a fundamental right, it would have had to apply
strict scrutiny analysis for both the due process and equal
protection claims since PCAP would therefore be interfering
with a fundamental right. Because the state has no compelling
interest until viability, PCAP could not have withstood the
first prong of strict scrutiny.
Instead, the court avoided this issue, notwithstanding the
fact that PCAP's constitutionality hinged upon a determination
of whether or not abortion is a fundamental right under the
state Constitution.181 The court sidestepped the question by
ambiguously stating that the defendants did not contest that
"[tihe fundamental right of reproductive choice, inherent in the
due process liberty right guaranteed by our State Constitution,
is at least as extensive as the Federal constitutional right."
182
The court also held that there was no need to analyze PCAP's
funding scheme under any test other than the rational relation
test-the lowest level of scrutiny for due process and equal
protection challenges-because no burden on a right exist-
the State's interest [of reducing low birthweight and infant mortality] is insuffi.
cient, and •. . far too burdensome on the eligible woman's right, to sustain [the
statute].").
1.. The court did, however, state that "it is undisputed by defendants that the
fundamental right to reproductive choice, inherent in the due process liberty guar-
anteed by [the] State Constitution, is at least as extensive as the Federal constitu-
tional right." Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 575, 634 NXE.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
1' Spencer, supra note 3, at 52. Chief Judge Kaye asked New York Civil Lib-
erties Union attorney Catherine Weiss, who represented the plaintiffs, if the
court's "recognition of a fundamental right to reproductive choice under the State
Constitution [was] essential" to the case. Id. Ms. Weiss answered that the court
must recognize the right before it determined whether it was burdened by PCAP.
Id.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (federal constitutional right to privacy is broad
enough to encompass right to abortion). But see infra note 258. Many criticize
Casey and question if abortion is still a fundamental right because the Court will
no longer apply strict scrutiny, the traditional analysis for a fundamental right;
rather, the plurality opinion adopted an "undue burden" standard of review.
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ed."8 In avoiding this question, the court also evaded another
inextricably intertwined issue-whether the New York Consti-
tution affords greater protection of reproductive choice than
the Federal Constitution. As a result, the court defined neither
the independence nor the scope of any state constitutional
guarantee.
Next, the court refused to answer whether the government
has an obligation to remain neutral regarding reproductive
health care and not prefer childbirth over abortion. The Su-
preme Court has held that the federal government does not
have to remain neutral on this issue and has thus permitted
states under the federal constitution to provide benefits to
women who carry to term while denying those benefits to wom-
en who have an abortion." Many state courts, however, have
interpreted their state constitutions as requiring the govern-
ment to remain neutral when extending benefits and therefore
forbid the state from exercising its financial power to influence
women's decisions."5
The court of appeals explicitly acknowledged this evasion
when it said that the "government obligation to stand neutral
[is] an issue we need not and do not reach in this case...
"18 The court dismissed this issue by concluding that PCAP
women, who are only slightly above the Medicaid line, are
distinguishable from Medicaid-eligible women whose "option to
choose an abortion is arguably foreclosed by her lack of re-
sources."" The court held that this "legislative premise [is]
not rebutted on the record before us.""5 By avoiding these
two questions, the court concluded that there was no "evidence
that eligible women are coerced, pressured, steered or induced
by PCAP to carry pregnancies to term."8 9
" Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.YS.2d at 816.
]'Maher v. Roe, 432 US. 464, 474 (1977) (state can make "a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the alloca-
tion of public funds").
' See infra notes 301-321 and accompanying text.
Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 576, 634 N3E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id. at 577, 634 NX..2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Id. at 576, 634 N.B.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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A. New York Jurisprudence
1. Federalism
In order to determine the extent to which state courts,
under their own constitutions, can expand protections of repro-
ductive freedom beyond the federal guarantee, one must first
analyze the role of a state court in the context of our federalist
system. An understanding of the United States Supreme Court
and its relationship to the state courts as independent inter-
preters of their constitutions begins with the notion that the
original states, including New York State, preceded the forma-
tion of the federal government and Federal Constitution.19
Each of the 50 states is an independent sovereign with its own
state constitution that exists separately and independently
from the United States Constitution.191
Although the Federal Constitution has emerged as the
primary source of fundamental rights,92 distinguished jurists
and scholars have encouraged state courts to look to their own
constitutions to supplement individual rights and fundamental
liberties.'93 Unlike the United States Constitution, which
grants enumerated powers to the federal government, state
constitutions are separate sources of both individual freedoms
and restrictions on the exercise of power by the Legisla-
ture.' The United States Supreme Court has long pro-
claimed that state constitutions may provide more expansive
protection of individual liberties than the Federal Constitu-
tion."'95 Although states cannot circumscribe rights guaran-
220 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982) (quoting People v.
Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)).
1 See Kimberly A. Chaput, Abortion Rights Under State Constitutions: Fighting
the Abortion War in the State Courts, 70 OR. L. REV. 593, 606 (1991).
2 Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1326, 1328 (1982) (hereinafter "Developments in the
Law").
9 Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 931. See also William J. Brennan Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
2" Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 931 (citations omitted). See Developments in the
Law, supra note 192, at 1326-28.
"2 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S 667 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Prunoyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714,
719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
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teed by the Federal Constitution, they are entirely free to in-
terpret their own law to supplement or expand them."'
A state may consider many factors when determining
whether its own constitution affords greater protection to indi-
vidual liberties and rights than the Federal Constitution guar-
antees. Courts often turn to the state constitution when the
language in the state provision differs from the Federal Consti-
tution and supports a broader interpretation of individual
rights under state law, 9 7 although states also analyze their
constitutional provisions differently than the United States
Supreme Court interprets an identical, corresponding federal
provision.'98 Another factor is whether the history of the text
reveals a state intention to broaden the right." The court al-
so may expand protection under state law when the very pur-
pose of a provision serves to afr certain rights rather than
merely restrain the sovereign power of the State."'
" People v. P.J. Vdeo, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d. 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982) ("Although the State Constitution may en-
compass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, [the] constellation of
rights may be more complete."). See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 US. at
81; Cooper, 386 U.S. at 62. See also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTMITTONAL LAW
§ 1.6[a]; Brennan, supra note 194.
" P.J. ideo, 68 N.Y.2d at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.YS.2d at 911.
"' Doe v. Department of Social Serv., 487 N.W.2d 166, 187 (Mich. 1992) (Mal-
let, J., dissenting); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293
(1982). A state court can use three different approaches when analyzing the state
constitution. First, the court can utilize the "lock-step approach," which entails the
state looking at the United States Constitution when interpreting a parallel state
constitutional provision. See David ]L Skover, Address: State Constitutional Law
Interpretation: Out of 'Lock Step" and Beyond 'Retroactive" Decisinmaking, 51
MONT. L. REV. 243, 245-46, 254 (1990); Villiam J. Brennan Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiano of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). Second, the court could chos the
"reactive posture method" in which a state generally follows federal precedent but
expands certain rights under its own constitution in isolated cases. Id. Third, the
"beyond the reactive approach" allows the state court to undertake a reparate and
independent state constitutional analysis before engaging in a federal constitutional
analysis. Id.
"' P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.YS.2d at 911.
0' Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
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2. New York State's Constitution is Historically Broader
than the Federal Constitution
Although recently a split in the New York Court of Ap-
peals20' has occurred, the court frequently construes the
scope of rights and liberties under the state constitution more
liberally than under the Federal Constitution.2  In particu-
lar, the court has expanded state constitutional protection for
privacy rights at times when the United States Supreme Court
interprets the federal counterpart more cautiously.2 3 Indeed,
the court of appeals is more likely to find a haven for these
rights under the state constitution at times when the Supreme
Court has restricted the same right under the Federal Consti-
tution.0 4 Consequently, the New York State Constitution is a
primary source of civil liberties to New Yorkers.25 New York
20' See infra notes 332-345.
202 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 NE.2d 556, 561, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 912 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
20. See infra notes 205, 212-219 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 205-234.
2 Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 993, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978; People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d
474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (due process rights of criminal
defendant expanded); People v. MVlardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990) (rejected federal rule regarding prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence); P.J. Vrideo, 68 N.Y.2d at 303-04, 501 NSE.2d at 560-61, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 912 (state constitution requires more exacting standard for issuance of
search warrants authorizing the seizure of obscene material than federal Constitu.
tion); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986)
(right of involuntarily committed mental patient to refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion); People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 218, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1986);
Bellanca v. State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765, 445 N.Y.S.2d 87
(1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982) (blanket ban on topless dancing);
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (statutory provisions for foreclosure of garageman's possessory
lien); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978)
(due process limits on police conduct); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) (right to counsel); Bryn v. New York City
Health and Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973) (upheld statute decriminalizing first
and second trimester abortions before federal courts did so); People v. Barber, 289
N.Y. 378, 46 N.E.2d 329 (1943); cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1983);
In re Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990)
(patients' constitutional right to refuse life-saving blood transfusion); Immuno A.G.
v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 NE.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. de-
nied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991) (rejected federal free press standard and granted broader
protection under state constitution); People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 NZE.2d
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has an enduring commitment to an independent and expansive
construction of the state constitution and "clearly has not hesi-
tated to diverge from the more restrictive constitutional law
interpretative tract pursued by the United States Supreme
Court, especially in recent years."0 6 In declining to be bound
by the Court's more limited interpretation of the Federal Con-
stitution, the court of appeals repeatedly has rejected applying
the federal interpretation to the New York State's Constitu-
tion.' Accordingly, the court endeavors to find a basis in
New York's constitution when necessary to protect individual
freedoms.'
The New York State Constitution's Equal Protection
clause, for example, offers broader protection than the federal
parallel by its language.' The drafters of the clause were
determined to provide broader rights under the state provision
than those afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 0
While the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action,
the drafters expanded protections by including individual ac-
61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989) (rejected Supreme Court's ruling in Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1985), which allowed police to search car's passenger compartment
in stop and frisk). See generally Pete Galie, State Constitutional Guarantows and
Protections of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 157 (1979). The very nature of the New York Constitution and state law
concern over fundamental fairness protects individual rights against encroachments
that pass muster under the federal Constitution. Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160-61,
379 NSE.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (quoting Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140, 146
(1843)).
Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
I&. at 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 NZ..2d 556, 561, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 912 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). According to the P.J.
Video court, 'Under established principles of federalism . .. States also have sov-
ereign powers.... Although State courts may not circumsibe rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own law to supplement or
expand them." Id. at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 559-60, 508 N.Y.S.2ad at 911.
"' Compare N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("No person shall, because of race, color,
creed, or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state of (any]
agency or subdivision of the state.") with U.S. CONST. AuEND. XIV, § 1 ("fnlor
shall any State . . .deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections
of the laws.").
210 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, PROBLEMS RELATING
TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE, Vol. VI at 221, 223, 227 (1930).
See also Edward . Alexander, The Right to Privacy and the New York State Con-
stitution: An Analytical Framework, 8 TOURO. L. REV. 725 (1992).
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tion as well as state action.21'
Another comparison can be made between the Federal
Constitution's Due Process Clause, which mandates that no
"state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law, '2 12 and New York's Due Process
clause which requires that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of the law." 13 New
York's Due Process clause,214 enacted before the federal coun-
terpart, differs from the Fourteenth Amendment because it
does not explicitly require state action before an individual
may find refuge in its protection. The unique interpretation of
this flexible language, based on the historical difference be-
tween the federal and state clauses, demonstrates that they
were adopted to combat entirely different evils. The Fourteenth
Amendment was a watershed attempt to extend national privi-
leges and immunities and furnish minimum standards protect-
ing individuals against the potential abuses of a monolithic
government.215 In contrast, the New York State Constitution
is an affirmative safeguard of individual rights.2"' The New
York State Due Process clause achieves this goal by protecting
liberties from attacks by both individuals and the state.217 In-
deed, the "function of the comparable provisions of the State
Constitution, if they are not to be considered purely redundant,
is to supplement those rights [under the federal constitution]
to meet the needs and expectations of the particular State."2'
18
211 Id.
212 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). See also U.S. CONST.
AMEND. V, ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . .
21 Id.
214 N.Y. CONST. Art. 1, § 6 ("no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of the law"). This clause does not eliminate the necessity
of state involvement in the challenged activity; however, "the absence of any State
action language simply provides a basis to apply a more flexible State involvement
requirement than is currently being imposed by the Supreme Court with respect
to the Federal provision." Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152,
160, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978).
216 Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 NE.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (quot-
ing Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges and Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come
Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 405). See also Brennan, supra note 194, at
501.
21 Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
217 Id. at 160-61, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (quoting Taylor v.
Porter, 4 Hill 140, 146 (1843)).
216 People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d
1510 [Vol. 61:1473
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As a result, on innumerable occasions, the New York State
courts have construed the state constitution to bestow greater
rights and liberties than those afforded under the Federal
Constitution.219
3. New York is a Leader in Abortion Rights
Another area where New York has expanded protection of
liberties from government intrusion is in the area of reproduc-
492, 494-95, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846-47 (1986).
2- Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 159, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.d at 44 (1978)
(expansion of state liberties "finds its genesis specifically in the unique language of
the due process clause of the New York State Constitution as well as the long
history of due process afforded the citizens of this State."); id. at 160, 379 NS.2d
at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (New York's due process clause has "long safeguarded
any threat to individual liberty irrespective of from what quarter that peril
arose"). See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 319, 94 N.E. 431,
448, 449 (1911); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 405 (1856). See also Immuno
A.G. v. Mfoor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 NE.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991) (first amendment protection under the New York
State Constitution despite the United States Supreme Court ruling that first
amendment rights were not indicated); People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570
N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1990) (defendant's station-house confession sup-
pressed under state constitutional prohibition of illegal searches and seizures even
though United States Supreme Court upheld its admission in 495 US. 14, 21
(1990)).
See also Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61
ST. JoHN's L. REV. 339, 412 (1987) (New York has a "long tradition of reading the
parallel clauses independently and affording broader protection... under the
State Constitution"); Vito J. Titone, State Constitution Interpretation: The Search
for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 466 (1986) (the histo-
ry of solicitude for a particular right has been used by the New York courts as a
foundation for fashioning a body of state constitutional law that is substantially
more protective than is the federal Constitution. Indeed, in New York, our tradi-
tions, which include judicial concern for the right of privacy and personal liberty,
make up a vital part of our judges' psyches .... "). One example of this broader
protection is that the court of appeals has interpreted the state constitution to
require further protection of criminal rights beyond those afforded in the Federal
Constitution. People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 309, 501 N.E.2d 556, 564, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 916 (1986) (state constitution imposed a more exacting standard for
the issuance of a search warrant authorizing the seizure of allegedly obscene ma-
terial than the Federal Constitution required, even though the applicable language
of both constitutions was identical.). Sce also People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y2d 417,
426-27, 488 N.,.2d 451, 457, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37 (1985) (court rejected good
faith exception to warrant clause under state constitution despite the fact that the
United States Supreme Court upheld the exception under the federal constitution
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981 (1984)).
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tive freedom." New York historically has been a leader in
protecting women's right to choose."l New York courts re-
peatedly have construed broader protections for abortion under
the state constitution than those deemed available under the
Federal Constitution. In this respect, New York State has
served as a model for other states to follow in this area.'
This phenomenon has proven particularly true when no relief
under federal law is available.'
In 1828, New York enacted legislation to permit abortions
necessary to save a mother's life. 4 The New York statute
became a model for subsequent state legislation across the
country; other states developed similar statutes.' Then in
1970, three years before Roe v. Wade, New York amended its
law and repealed previously existing criminal sanctions for
first and second trimester abortions. 6 This repeal made New
York one of the first two states' to legalize abortion under
22 See infra notes 222-254 and accompanying text for examples.
21 See infra notes 222-254 and accompanying text for examples.
22 Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 294, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952. See also Luke Bierman,
When Less Is More: Changes to the New York Court of Appeals' Civil Jurisdiction,
12 PACE L. REV. 61, 62 (1992) (the "New York Court of Appeals' decisions have
long been considered influential on a national scale") (relying on John Henry
Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation
Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 381, 401-03 (1977)).
2 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474,
593 NXE.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992); People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555
N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990); In re Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers
v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987); People
v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 NYE.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986); O'Neill v.
Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 NE.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988);
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 NXE.2d 492, 510
N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986); Bryn v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d
194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972); People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 46
N.E.2d 329 (1943).
22 James P. O'Hair, A Brief History of Abortion in the United States, 262
JAMA 1875 (1989).
"2 Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, New York enacted legislation in 1928
that served as a model for early anti-abortion statutes which prohibited both pro-
and post-quickening abortions, both of which were punishable under the criminal
laws. Bonnie L. Hertberg, Resolving the Abortion Debate: Compromise Legislation,
an Analysis of the Abortion Policies of the United States, France and Germany, 16
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 513, 515 n.22 (1993). The 1928 statute excluded from
criminal punishment an abortion which was necessary to preserve the life of the
mother or which was recommended by two physicians. Id.
226 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05[3] (McKinney 1992); Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 991,
517 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
'7 Hawaii was the first state, but New York immediately followed and within
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the circumstances delineated by the American Law Institute
guidelines.' In decriminalizing abortion, the legislature rec-
ognized that the state had no right to interfere with the most
personal and important decision a woman could make regard-
ing her body and her life. Repeal of criminal sanctions became
the "cornerstone principle of what has come to be recognized as
a woman s constitutional right to abortion,"' improved abor-
tion conditions, and decreased maternal deaths from illegal
abortions.'
Because of this history, New York traditionally has been a
haven for women seeking reproductive freedom, particularly
when the right was wavering on the federal level." Very few
states had passed pro-abortion legislation in 1970; those that
did, such as New York, attracted many nonresidents seeking
abortions. 2 By the time that Roe v. Wade had secured this
right on the federal level,' sixty percent of New York's abor-
tions involved women from out of state2  Again, when
Planned Parenthood v. Casey" threatened to abolish abor-
tion on the federal level, state officials prepared New York
State for an onslaught of women seeking protection under the
state laws. 6 Since then, out-of-state women still comprise
months enacted the New York State Abortion Law Reform. OHair, supra note
225, at 3.
' In 1962, the American Law Institute promulgated section 203.3 of the Mcdel
Penal Codel which described circumstances under which abortion should not be
punished. Specifically, the Code excluded from criminal prohibition abortions which
were performed when the pregnancy would impair the mental or physical health of
the mother, when the child was at risk of being born with grave physical or men-
tal defects, or when the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or other felonious
intercourse. Hertberg, supra note 226, at 516. Between 1967 and 1973, nineteen
states amended their restrictive abortion laws, many of which were modeled after
the Model Penal Code. Julia Walsh, Reproductive Rights and the Human Ganome
Project, 4 J. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 145, 1568 (1994). Now York went
further and repealed its criminal abortion statute for abortions performed early in
pregnancies. Id.
Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 991, 571 N.Y.S.2a at 976.
o O'Hair, supra note 225, at 3.
' See infra notes 255-268.
O'Hair, supra note 225, at 3.
See supra note 5.
2' John Riley, The Abortion Ruling, The Outlook for N.Y., NEWSDAY, June 30,
1992, at 87.
6' 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In this case, the lower court upheld Pennsylvania's
extremely restrictive abortion regulations including parental and spousal consent
requirements, a mandatory waiting period, and informed consent provisions.
"' Id. In 1992, because of the federal cutback on abortion rights, New York
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5% of the 150,000 abortions performed in New York. 7
New York also continuously has struck down restrictions
on abortion under state law that have survived under the Fed-
eral Constitution." For the past seventeen years, over twen-
ty-five bills proposing parental notification for minors seeking
abortions have failed in New York. 9 New York also has re-
sisted informed consent and biased counseling laws.2'4 Nor
State health regulators reviewed their rules to prepare for a possible influx of
women from out of state seeking abortions. Surrounding states were likely to pass
restrictions of the sort the Supreme Court approved in Pennsylvania. "It may
mean we'll see a return to the time when NY was a haven for women looking for
legal abortions," said Peter Slocum, Dept. of Health Spokesman. Riley, supra note
234.
Riley, supra note 234.
ss See infra notes 256-268.
' S.3225/A.5581, 1993-94 Session (requires parental notice prior to performance
of an abortion on unemancipated minor with waiver in limited circumstances) and
S.3224/A.5580 (requires parental consent of unemancipated minor unless judge
issues order of consent, or delay may result in death or grave physical danger, or
good faith reliance by physician that minor is eighteen or older). Neither reached
a floor vote. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 17 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1993)
(prohibits the release of minor's pertinent medical records to parents or guardians).
Compare Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 453-55 (1990) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (parental notification requirement with judicial bypass before minor could
obtain abortion constitutional) with Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497
U.S. 502, 506-07 (1990) (upholding notice to one parent or judicial authorization
before minor could obtain abortion). Parental consent provisions require that young
women, usually under the age of 18, obtain one parent's "informed consent" before
she can have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(upholding one parent's consent with judicial bypass before abortion could be per-
formed); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (upholding statute requiring paren-
tal consent before abortion performed on minor as long as alternative procedure
provided). Likewise, a parental notification requirement demands that the young
woman "notify" one parent. See Akron Center, 497 U.S. at 506-07. In both cases, a
young woman can only avoid the requirement through a judicial bypass procedure
where she presents her case before a judge and obtains a court order allowing the
abortion. Id. The problem with these requirements is that young women are de-
terred from seeking reproductive medical care if they are required to inform their
parents. In this case, the provision does nothing to help young women and only
restricts access to abortion. Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The
Impact of the New Undue Burden Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269
JAMA 2249, May 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, News File, JAMA library, at *12-
13.
240 "Informed consent" and "biased counseling" provisions allegedly ensure that
the woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy is an informed decision. Their
methods and requirements, however, are "biased" because they clearly act as a
discouragement to abortion. The Supreme Court upheld one such provision in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Chief Justice Rehnquist ac-
knowledged that "the information might . . . persuade some women to forgo abor-
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has the state permitted a mandatory delay policy."' New
York's resistance to these restrictions reflects the recognition
that such a policy serves no effective goal and would only exac-
erbate the plight of poor women.242 Many women would have
tions [but this] does not lead to the conclusion that the Constitution forbids [it]."
505 U.S. at 968 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The provision upheld in Casey requires the attending doctor to outline the abortion
procedure, inform the woman of the fetus's probable gestationnI age, and advise
the woman of possible health risks associated with abortion and carrying the preg-
nancy to term. I&. at 882-84. The doctor also must give the woman state-spon-
sored material that includes pictures of the fetus at two-week gestational intervals,
lists alternatives to abortion, and informs her of the availability of public assis-
tance programs to help her pay for prenatal and neonatal care. Id. at 907. The
woman then must wait 24 hours after the information is given to her oven if the
abortion is medically necessary. Benshoot supra note 239, at *IL See N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 4161, 4163 (McKinney 1993) (protects anonymity of women who
obtain abortions by omitting identifing information on fetal death certificates and
provides penalties for release of identifying information). But cee S.3295/.5590
(1993-94 Session) (enacts woman's right to know act providing for informed con-
sent of woman prior to abortion) (stuck in Committee). See also N.Y. JUD. LAW §
4 (McKinney 1983) (permits courts to exercise discretion to close courtrooms in
abortion cases); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 394-e (cKinney 1984) (provides penalties
for release of reports of referrals for abortion services except to agencies autho-
rized by statute).
I Mandatory delay provisions require that women wait a certain amount of
time after an initial consultation before they are able to obtain an abortion. In
Casey, the plurality upheld such a provision, explaining that it ensures the deci-
sion is informed and protects the state's interest in potential life by discouraging
abortion. 505 U.S. at 885-87. However, as Justice Stevens noted, 'Te State can-
not further its interests by simply wearing down the ability of the pregnant wom-
an to exercise her constitutional right.7 Casey, 505 US. at 918 (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
Furthermore, "there is no evidence that the mandated delay benefits women
or that it is necessary to enable the physician to convey any relevant information
to the patient." Id- Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Stevens that the provi-
sion was unconstitutional because the delay requirement 'rests either on outmoded
or unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of women or the
belief that the decision to terminate the pregnancy is presumptively wrong...
[and this requirement will] only influence the woman's decision in improper ways.
Id. at 937-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). These
provisions therefore effectively only serve to curtail women's access to abortion
services. Benshoof, supra note 239 at 12, 13.
, Casey, 505 U.S. at 937-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Blackmun explained that the mandatory delay policy
impermissibly influences a woman's decision and operates as a substantial obstacle
to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. Id. For example, delaying the proce-
dure could increase health risks. Id. at 937. Women also face financial constraints
because the policy requires two separate visits to the abortion provider which in-
creases travel time and financial costs, such as transportation fees, time off from
work, babysitter fees, etc., particularly for women who live in rural areas. Id.
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to take time off from work to travel to the facility several
times. 43 These delays could jeopardize women's health and
increase the cost of the procedure as the pregnancy advances
into later stages.244 In fact, the only restriction New York has
imposed on abortion is that a licensed physician must perform
the procedure."5
New York's long-standing commitment to abortion rights
also is demonstrated by its policy of funding abortions for poor
women since 1978."6 Even after the passage of the Hyde
Amendment,247 which prohibits Medicaid Funding of abor-
tions except in cases of rape, incest, or threat to the life or
health of the woman, New York continued to afford greater
protection to women's right to reproductive freedom than the
Furthermore, the delay requires a woman to subject herself twice to harassment
and abuse by clinic protestors. Id.
2Id.
" See supra notes 137-145 and accompanying text (testimony that delays in
abortion procedure increases risk of complications and cost of procedure). See also
Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 134, at 171 (quoting C. Tietze, Induced Abortion:
A World Review (5th ed. 1983) (risk of death increases by almost 30% each week
of gestation over eight weeks, and risk of major complications increases 20% each
additional week past the eighth week)).
" Riley, supra note 234, at 87.
" See Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 992, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
247 Pub. L. No. 94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976). In 1976, Congress amended
the Labor-Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Appropriations Act by adopting a
rider which limited abortion funding to cases where the mother's life was endan-
gered if the fetus was carried to term. (Pub. L. No. 94-439 § 209, 90 Stat. 1434
(1976); see Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 833 n.10 (3d Cir. 1980). It was named the
"Hyde Amendment" after Congressman Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), who proposed an
initial amendment to prevent funds from being used to "pay for abortions or to
promote or encourage abortions." 122 CONG. REC. 20,410 (1976).
A subsequent version of the amendment expanded funding to include victims
of rape and incest and situations in which carrying the pregnancy to term would
result in "severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother." Pub. L.
No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977). In 1980, Congress once again deleted the
"physical health damage" exception. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926
(1979). A Medicaid-eligible woman challenged the restriction and the Supreme
Court upheld the exclusion of abortions that were not necessary to save the moth-
er's life. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). President Clinton signed into
law a version of the Hyde Amendment that provides federal Medicaid funds for a
larger range of abortions, but still excludes medically necessary abortions. See
Department of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-112, § 509, 107 Stat. 1002,
1115 (1993) (provides that no funds "appropriated under this Act shall be expend-
ed for any abortion except when . . . necessary to save the life of the mother or
(when) the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest").
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federal government by including Medicaid funding for abor-
tions for all women whose income was at or below one hundred
percent of federal poverty line.24 As one of only thirteen
states that pay for abortions with state money, New York con-
sistently includes all medically necessary abortions in the state
Medicaid program in spite of the Supreme Court ruling that
the exclusion is not unconstitutional.249 In In re New York
City v. Wyman," the court of appeals upheld the State Com-
missioner of Social Services' directive that allowed Medicaid
reimbursements for medically necessary abortions."' The
court viewed this legislation as a means "to afford indigents
the opportunity to obtain abortions in situations where other-
wise only the well-to-do would be able to obtain competent
medical intervention and reform would thus 'reduce discrimi-
nation against the poor." 2 Medicaid funding of abortions
demonstrates New York's commitment to the right to choose as
well as the reality that the federal government does not protect
its citizens' rights in the same manner as the state constitu-
tion.
Finally, New York City goes one step further by providing
free abortions to PCAP-eligible women at its own expense. The
city authorized the New York City Health and Hospital Corpo-
ration to execute this policy because it realized that, after
subtracting basic expenses such as rent, food, and transporta-
tion, eligible women who make between $99 to $921 a month
are "not free to save" for an abortion that costs between $235
and $1,000.2
21 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW, § 365-a[2], [5][b]. See also In re City of Nov York v.
Wyman, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 NS.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972); Donovan v.
Cuomo, 126 AJf.2d 305, 513 N.Y.S.2d 878 (3d Dep't 1987). Sce afro Hope, 150
Misc. 2d at 992, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 977; Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 575, 634 NE.2d at 184,
611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
2u N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 365-912], [5][b], 189 N.Y.C.R.R. 505.2(e); Hope, 83
N.Y.2d at 572, 645 N..2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980).
20 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180, 330 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1972).
2 Id at 538, 281 N.E.2d at 181, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
2S2 Id. at 540, 281 N.E.2d at 182, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
'" Hope, 150 Misc. 2d at 992-93, 571 N.Y.S.2cl at 977.
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4. New York's Stare Decisis and Abortion Rights
Abortion rights are precisely the type of issue over which
state courts depart from federal interpretation because of inad-
equate protection of those rights under the United States Con-
stitution. When state and federal provisions are similarly
worded and the federal provision is "underenforced," many
argue that this situation presents the best context for a state
to turn to its own constitution and interpret it more broadly
than the United States Supreme Court has the Federal Consti-
tution.'
The United States Supreme Court increasingly has re-
stricted abortions rights since Roe v. WadeY 5 As recently as
1993, the Supreme Court announced a new standard of review
for the constitutional evaluation of abortion restrictions in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. "6In Casey, the majority reject-
ed the strict scrutiny standard utilized in Roe' 1 and held
' Lawrence Sager, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Strategic Space Be-
tween the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985).
2" 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497
U.S. 502 (1990); Planned Parenthood Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (state may, in most situations, insist that par-
ents receive notification of their minor daughter's abortion); Belotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979) (requirement of parental consultation and consent, or court approv-
al prior to permitting unmarried minors to undergo abortion; states may require
minor to convince judge either that she is mature enough to make the abortion
decision herself, or that terminating the pregnancy is in her best interest).
Likewise, although Roe held that the state's interest in protecting the fetus is
not superior to the mother's interest in her health and life, the Supreme Court
has upheld restrictions that appear to be contrary to Roe. See Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979) (requirement that physician determine fetal viability prior to
performing abortion; imposing criminal and civil sanctions for failure to exercise
care to save fetal life); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
(1976) (requirement of parental consent prior to an abortion; prohibition of saline
abortion after first trimester; imposing civil and criminal sanctions for failure to
exercise care to save fetal life) (overruled by Casey); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973) (limiting those hospitals in which abortions could be performed; requiring
prior hospital committee approval and concurrence of three doctors that abortion is
necessary). Furthermore, informed consent, mandatory waiting periods and required
physician testing restrict access to abortion, both financially and physically. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding informed consent,
mandatory waiting period).
26 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2'7 410 U.S. at 155 (state cannot interfere with woman's choice in first trimes-
ter because abortion is fundamental right under the right to privacy).
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that an abortion regulation will be upheld as long as it does
not "unduly burden" a woman's choice.' Under this new
standard, however, it is highly questionable whether abortion
remains a fundamental right, warranting the same strong
protections such as the right to free speech and the right to
vote 9 Indeed, the undue burden standard indicates that the
Supreme Court is backing away from protecting women's con-
stitutional right to abortion."e
I "Only where the state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's
ability to make [the decision whether or not to continue her pregnancy] does the
power of the State reach into the heart of the [protected] liberty." Cadoy, 505 U.S.
at 874. An "undue burden" test is not the highest level of scrutiny and is indeed
a drastic departure from the more rigorous standard of review announced in Roe
which prohibited restrictions upon abortion unless they wore narrowly drawn to
serve a compelling state interest. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. As a result, in the first
and second trimesters, the mother's interest in her health outweighs any state
interest in the fetus. Id. at 163. During the first two trimesters, the state can
only regulate the abortion procedure as it reasonably relates to maternal health.
Id. Therefore the state's interest in the potential life does not become compelling
until the third trimester and the point of viability-where the fetus presumably
has the capacity to have meaningful life outside the mother's womb. Id. Further-
more, Roe held that although the state could proscribe abortions after viability, it
still could not prohibit the procedure when it was necessary to "preserve the life
or health of the mother." Id. In Casey, the Court recognized that Roe forbade any
regulation of abortion "designed to advance [the state's interest in the potential
life] before viability." Casey, 505 U.S. at 876. The plurality, however, explicitly
overruled this principle when it held that the government can attempt to influence
a woman's decision on behalf of the fetus before viability. .. The Court reasoned
that the state had a strong interest in the fetus throughout the pregnancy;, conse-
quently, the government was permitted to enact regulations at any point during
the pregnancy as long as they are reasonably related to promoting childbirth over
abortion. I& at 883. The Court rejected the strict scrutiny level of review to ana-
lyze such a regulation and merely requires that the regulation not place a "sub-
stantial obstacle" or impose an "undue burden" on the woman's exercise of her
liberty. Id. at 874.
"' Sen. Labor Comm., The Freedom of Choice Act of 1992, S. RES. 321, 102d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 10 (1992) (arguing that the "undue burden standard" is a major
departure from Roe and abortion is no longer a fundamental right); see also
Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:.
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1151, 1154 (1993). But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 924 (Blackmun, J, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Casey reaffirmed the central and essential holding in
Roe).
"' See, e.g., Benshoof; supra note 239 at "7 ("'The Court's new, less rigorous
standard of review adopted in Casey will permit states to impose laws ...that
will hinder women from obtaining reproductive health care .... "); Kolbert &
Gans, supra note 260, at 1153 (iDespite the strong language in Casey, the Court
actually backed away from affording women the highest level of constitutional
protection for the abortion choice.").
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court consistently has upheld
public funding restrictions for abortions. Women's right to
reproductive freedom on the federal level has been diminished
because the exclusion of funding for many women restricts
their access to abortion.26' In 1980, for example, a five mem-
ber majority upheld the Hyde Amendment 62 that prohibited
federal reimbursement for abortions under the Medicaid pro-
gram except when necessary to save the mother's life. 3 The
Court ruled that states were not required to fund medically
necessary abortions that the federal government would not
reimburse.2" The Court reasoned that although the govern-
ment may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's freedom
of choice, it was not required to remove previously existing
obstacles, such as indigency 5  In validating the statute, the
Court rejected plaintiffs' challenges under the Constitution's
Due Process 2"6 and Equal Protection267 clauses and held
that the restriction did not impinge upon the due process liber-
"' See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding
prohibition on the use of public facilities and employees in the scope of employ-
ment, prohibited public funding for abortion counseling, and permitted viability
testing prior to performing abortions); Williams v. Zbarez, 448 U.S. 358 (1980) (up-
holding under equal protection clause a state statute prohibiting state medical
assistance for all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (upholding the exclusion of purely elective,
nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage because indigency is not a sus-
pect class and bore rational relation to State's legitimate interest in encouraging
childbirth); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, states could refuse to fund nontherapeutic abortions under states' medical
programs for needy persons).
262 See supra note 247.
2 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See Soc. Sec. Act, Title XIX, 79 Stat.
343, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 & Supp. Il 1991).
26, Harris, 448 U.S. at 311.
6 Id. at 316-17. The Court based it decision on the same reasoning it used in
Maher u. Roe. Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary ser-
vices generally, but not medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that this
funding scheme leaves the indigent woman with the same range of choices she
would have if the legislature decided not to subsidize health care costs at all. Id.
at 317. "It simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it
a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full
range of protected choices." Id. at 316. Again using the rational.relation test, the
Court found that refusing to fund abortions except when necessary to save the life
of the mother bore a rational relationship to the state's "legitimate interest in
protecting the potential life of the fetus." Id. at 324.
26 Id. at 318, 319-20; U.S. CONST. amend. I.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
267 Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-23; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ty recognized in Roe v. Wade.26
In light of the insufficient protection of abortion rights
under the Federal Constitution, combined with New York's
precedent of favoring broad protection for abortion rights, the
New York Court of Appeals in Hope would have had a difficult
time justifying a holding that the state is not required to fund
abortions for poor women. It is within precisely this context
that women would expect New York's constitution to supple-
ment the federal right and offer more expansive protection
S Four members of the Court vigorously dissented and attacked the opinion on
several points. One particular contention was that because Congress had denied
Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions, the Hyde Amendment was not
supported by a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify its restriction on the
exercise of a fundamental right to choose abortion. The Court based its conclusion
on Roe v. Wade's holding that the state's interest in the fetus could never out-
weigh the mother's interest in her health before the third trimester. See Roe, 410
U.S. at 155 (after the second trimester, state's interest in fetus is compelling).
Justice Stevens explained that the Courts earlier decision in Roe v. Wade prevent-
ed the state from denying a woman who needs an abortion for medical reasons
medical benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled, solely to further an in-
terest in the fetus. Harris, 448 U.S. at 352. According to Roe, after the second
trimester, the state's interest in the fetus is compelling thereby permitting the
state to prohibit abortions. 410 U.S. at 163. This right, however, is not absolute;
Roe explicitly held that the state can only prohibit abortions during the third
trimester "as long as it is not necessary to preserve the mother's life or health?
Id. The Harris dissenters therefore reasoned that by denying women money to pay
for an abortion to preserve their health, the state violated Roe because the state
was preferring its own interest in the fetus at the expense of the mother's interest
in her health. Harris, 448 U.S. at 352. For an analysis of Harris and a discussion
of abortion-funding cases generally, tee Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits
of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to the
Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare.Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
721 (1981).
For criticisms on Supreme Court funding decisions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERCAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW, 134647 (2d ed. 1988); Michael J. Perry, Why the
Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Cace: A Brief Com-
ment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1113-28 (1980); Kathleen M
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1500.01 (1989). As
a result of their decisions, the number of federally funded abortions plummeted
from 294,600 in 1977 to 267 in 1992, with federal expenditures, in actual dollars,
falling from $89 million to $332,000. With the federal government abandoning
these women, the responsibility for providing subsidized abortion services fell to
the states. In 1992, the states reported spending a total of nearly $80 million of
their own revenues to pay for 202,355 abortions to indigent women. Almost all of
these 200,000 abortions (99.9 percent) were performed in the 13 states that contin-
ue to fund most medically necessary abortions. For states that continue to use
state Medicaid funds for abortions, see infra note 309. See also Daniel Daley &
Rachel B. Gold, Public Funding for Contraceptive, Sterilizations, and Abortion
Services, Fiscal Year 1992, 25 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 244 (1993).
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under state law for the right to choose. 9 It therefore appears
that the court purposely failed to address this issue rather
than handing down a decision that was inconsistent with innu-
merable cases decided upon state constitutional grounds. °
The court of appeals' earlier decisions clearly illustrate
that state constitutional rights have been guaranteed consis-
tently, even when the United States Supreme Court fails to
protect these liberties under the Federal Constitution. It is
precisely this scenario, where the federal right to privacy has
grown tenuous in the wake of Casey, 1 Harris,272 and Web-
ster,273 that the New York Court of Appeals traditionally has
expanded coverage under the state constitution beyond that
afforded under the Federal Constitution. The court could not
declare explicitly that abortion was not a fundamental right
under the state constitution without violating stare decisis 4
As noted, New York jurisprudence warrants a more expansive
protection for abortion as a fundamental right under the state
constitution." Directly overturning or ignoring precedent se-
riously undermines the court's integrity.16 In recognition of
this fact, the lower courts found that PCAP's funding scheme
-the only assistance plan in the state that does not fund abor-
tion-was inconsistent with New York's long, liberal history of
aiding needy residents, and therefore was contrary to New
York's constitutional right to due process.
Moreover, if the court had rejected the principle that abor-
tion was a fundamental right under the New York State Con-
289 Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 295, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 952 ("The Court of Appeals, which
clearly has not hesitated to diverge from the more restrictive constitutional law
interpretive track pursued by the United States Supreme Court ... has an endur-
ing commitment to an independent and expansive construction of the state consti.
tution.").
" Hope, 189 AJD.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948.
271 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
272 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
273 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
2' See supra note 173.
278 Hope, 150 Misc.2d at 991-92, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77.
27 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 ("to overrule under fire in the absence of
the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subject the
court's legitimacy beyond any serious question"); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (recognizing that no judicial
system could do society's work if it "eyed each issue afresh" in every case that
raised it).
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stitution, this decision would have been irreconcilable with
other decisions that would seem to imply generous state pro-
tection for women's reproductive freedom.2" The court of ap-
peals expansively had interpreted the state constitution to
safeguard rights that are particularly personal and intimate in
nature.' As early as 1914, New York's highest court recog-
nized that each person "of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body...
." The state constitutional right to privacy is "the broad,
general right to make decisions concerning oneself and to con-
duct oneself in accordance with those decisions free of govern-
mental restraint or interference."' Inherent in this right to
privacy is the right of an individual to make personal decisions
on extremely private issues concerning contraception, procre-
ation, marriage, and abortion without government interfer-
ence." l Additionally, in Rivers v. Katz,' the court of ap-
peals held that the state constitution recognizes that patients
'"See infra notes 279-284 and accompanying text.
'"See Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1979) (right to personal contact visits, as distinguished from conjugal visits, for
pretrial detainees was recognized under state constitution), cert. denied, 446 US.
984 (1980); see also supra notes 202-219 and accompanying text.
'" Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 9,
93 (1914).
' In re Coughlin v. Doe, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 52, 518 N.E.2d 536, 539, 523 N.Y.S.2d
782, 785 (1987). See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men!).
"3 The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the listed rights are
fundamental under the constitutional right to privacy. Doe v. Coughlin, 71 N.Y.2d
48, 518 N.E.2d 536, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1987); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476,
415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980). See Turner v. Safley, 482 US. 78 (1987)
(extending fundamental right to marry to prison inmates and striking down a vir-
tual flat ban on marriage); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (establishing
constitutional right to marry in the course of striking down a state law allowing
parents with court-imposed child-support obligations to remarry only if obligations
were met and children were not likely to go on public assistanc); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion included in fundamental right to privacy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating law that banned distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967)
(invalidating law against interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 US.
479 (1965) (state cannot penalize married couple's use of contraceptives); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (state cannot sterilize repeated lareenists while
imprisoning repeated embezzlers because there is a fundamental right to procre-
ate).
'"67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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have a fundamental liberty interest to determine their own
medical treatment and may refuse medicine even if such refus-
al endangers their lives.' The court held that the individual
must have the final say in these matters "in order to insure
that the greatest possible protection is accorded his autonomy
and freedom from unwanted interference with the furtherance
of his own desires."
In numerous cases, New York courts have expanded this
state right to privacy and implicitly have held that abortion is
a fundamental right.' The court in In re Klein, for example,
held that the state has "no compelling interest in the protec-
tion of the fetus prior to viability" since the mother's right to
choose abortion under her constitutional right to privacy "is
paramount at that stage."' 6 In that case, the court permitted
a husband to sign informed consent forms to authorize an
abortion for his comatose pregnant wife. 7 The plaintiffs,
2' Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (right to refuse medical
treatment is fundamental and coexists with patients' liberty interest guaranteed by
the due process clause); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
' Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (upholding
fundamental right of bodily autonomy and permitting involuntarily committed men-
tal patients to refuse anti-psychotic medicine, even if such medication was neces-
sary to save life).
In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d 145, 147, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (2d Dep't 1989), ap-
peal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 705, 536 N.E.2d 627, 539 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1989). In this case,
the appellate division upheld the lower court's decision to appoint the husband of
a comatose pregnant woman to be her guardian and sign an informed consent
abortion authorization form. In doing so, the court rejected an application made by
complete strangers who intervened solely to prevent the pregnancy's termination.
The court denied the application to appoint the strangers as guardians of the fetus
because the fetus, which was under 24 weeks old and therefore not yet viable,
was not a "legally recognized 'person' for the purposes of proceedings such as
these." Id. at 147, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
Furthermore, the court held that the state has "no compelling interest in the
protection of the fetus prior to viability since the mother's constitutional right to
privacy, which includes the right to terminate her pregnancy, is paramount at that
stage." Id. See also Bryn v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d
194, 386 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) (upholding New York's 1970 statute
decriminalizing first and second trimester abortions and refused to recognize the
legal personality of fetus), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973). See also N.Y.
PENAL LAW 125.05(3) (McKinney 1987).
' In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d at 147, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 275. The court did not dis-
tinguish between federal and state privacy rights.
28' Id. at 146, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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who had no relation to the mother or fetus, sought to be ap-
pointed guardian of both the pregnant woman and her fetus to
prevent the husband from terminating the pregnancy.2 The
Second Department rejected the argument that the fetus was a
person and ruled that the "mother's constitutional right to
privacy... includes the right to terminate her pregnancy
...... Furthermore, the court's requirement of a compelling
state interest demonstrates that it applied strict scrutiny anal-
ysis. Strict scrutiny does not apply unless a fundamental right
is implicated. The court therefore implicitly acknowledged that
the right to choose abortion is a fundamental right.
Likewise, in Steinhoff v. Steinhoff, the court prohibited a
husband from forbidding his wife from obtaining or any hospi-
tal from performing an abortion on his wife." These cases
demonstrate that New York courts favor protecting reproduc-
tive freedom from interference by others and from interference
by the court itself. In accordance with this tradition, it is not
surprising that both the New York Supreme Court and Appel-
late Division have held that the right of a pregnant woman to
choose an abortion in circumstances where it is medically nec-
essary is one component of the right of privacy rooted in the
Due Process clause ' of the New York State Consti-
tution.' Indeed, Attorney General Robert Abrams, repre-
senting the defendants in the Hope v. Perales' appeal, conceded
that there is a state constitutional right to abortion.
2M Id.
- Id. at 147, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
2' 140 Mlise. 2d 397, 531 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1988); sec also
In re Mary P., 111 Mlisc. 2d 532, 444 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Far. Ct Queens County
1981) (mother of pregnant teenager cannot force her daughter to have an abortion
or otherwise interfere with the decision to carry to term).
2" See supra notes 212-219 (defining the scope of privacy under due process);
see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("[tlhis right to privacy, whether it
be found in the -Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy."); id. at 154 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision . . . ").
292 Hope, 150 fisc.2d at 994, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 978. Se, eg., In re Klein, 145
A.D.2d 145, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2d Dep't 1989), appeal denied, 73 N.Y2d 705, 536
N.E.2d 627, 539 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1989); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; Mar i Brown, Com-
ment, Hope v. Perales Expanding Medically Necessary Abortion Rights of Pregnant
Indigent Women Under New York and Nebraska State Constitutional Due Process
Clauses, 72 NEB. L. REV. 586, 605 n.114 (1993).
2 Riley, supra note 234, at 87.
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The court of appeals itself has continued to protect other
individual rights beyond that afforded by the United States
Supreme Court. New York has extended the right to privacy in
areas where the Supreme Court has refused. For example, the
court continues to cite as good law 4 a decision that struck
down a penal statute that had criminalized all forms of sod-
omy, 5 even though the Supreme Court later upheld a simi-
lar statute in Bowers v. Hardwick.2 6 In People v. Onofre, the
court of appeals held that banning all forms of sodomy violated
the Federal Constitution because such a ban was
overbroad.297 The court reasoned that the right of adults to
engage in consensual sex of all types included consensual sod-
omyY It found that there was no rational basis for exclud-
"' See, e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 489, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1992) (citing People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936,
434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980)); id. at 487, 593 NE.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927
(the right to be left alone is "a core principle reflected in our cases vindicating a
broader privacy right in areas other than search and seizure"); id. at 488, 593
N.E.2d at 1337 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929 (acknowledging "New York's tradition of toler-
ance of the unconventional and of what may appear bizarre or even offensive.");
Coughlin v. In re Doe, 71 N.Y.2d 48, 52, 518 NYE.2d 536, 639, 523 N.Y.S.2d 782,
785 (1987) ("The right to privacy, in constitutional terms, involves freedom of
choice, the broad, general right to make decisions concerning oneself and to con-
duct oneself in accordance with those decisions free of governmental restraint or
interference."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988); People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d
202, 210, 500 NE.2d 297, 302-03, 507 N.Y.S.2d 977, 982-83 (1986) (distinguishing
public and private morality).
"' People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 949 (1980). The statute was also invalid on equal protection grounds because
it only applied to unmarried persons. Id. at 491-92, 415 N.E.2d at 942-43, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 953. See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7 at 18-20 (as to fundamental
rights in general), §18.30 [a] (2d ed. 1992) (as to the right to engage in sexual
acts). New York courts also have continued to protect the right of pretrial
detainees to have contact visits under the state constitution even though the Su-
preme Court later ruled that this right is not guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion. Cf Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y. 2d 69, 399 NZE.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
26 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The defendant in Onofre also was a male who was
convicted of committing a sexually deviant act with another male in his home.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 983, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
2" Id. at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952 ("Personal feelings of
distaste for [consensual sodomy] and even disapproval by a majority of the popu-
lace, if that disapproval were to be assumed, may not substitute for the required
demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of important
personal decision protected under the right of privacy drawn from the United
States Constitution . . . ").
2'8 Id. at 490-91, 415 N..2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
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ing protection for decisions "to seek sexual gratification from
what at least once was commonly regarded as 'deviant' con-
duct, so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in
a noncommercial, private setting." After Onofre, the United
States Supreme Court refused to expand the Constitution to
include a right to homosexual sodomy and distinguished this
conduct from the constitutional right to abortion as articulated
in Roe."' In Bowers, the Supreme Court rejected the same
argument that the court of appeals had upheld in Onofre-that
due process prohibits government proscription of private sexual
conduct between consenting adults. Despite Bowers the Court
of Appeals continues to rely on Onofre as broadening the right
to privacy to include certain private actions, such as consensu-
al adult sodomy, that are simply beyond the government's
reach. If New York's jurisprudence is broad enough to protect
homosexual conduct, in spite of a contrary federal decision, the
court of appeals would have had a difficult time concluding
that the state does not offer extended protection for abortion
rights. In the context of federal erosion of this right, it indeed
may have been irreconcilable for the court to reject expanded
abortion rights in Hope, yet continue to recognize some consti-
tutional right to consensual sodomy.
B. Jurisprudence In Similarly Situated States
The New York Court of Appeals would have faced another
obstacle had it determined that abortion was not a fundamen-
tal right: such a decision would have "bucked the trend" of
several similarly situated states that have upheld funding for
"' Id. at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
=0 In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 189, 190-91 (1986), the court stated,
[We think it evident that none of the rights announced in [Griswold v.
Connecticut (contraception), Eisenstadt v. Baird (contraception), Roe v.
Wade (abortion), and Loving v. Virginia (marriage)] bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between fami-
ly, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other has been demonstrated... . Moreover, any claim that these
cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated
from state proscriptions is unsupportable.
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abortions under an expanded state constitutional right."1
Against the backdrop of the federal erosion of abortion rights,
state constitutions have grown even more important in the
fight for women's reproductive freedom and have become the
real battleground for women when challenging abortion restric-
tions.0 2 If the court of appeals did not expand protection for
abortion in New York, which has always been a leader in abor-
tion rights, the court risked handing down a decision that was
inconsistent not only with its own but with other states' juris-
prudence as well. 3
Throughout the country women have been turning to their
state legislatures and state courts in seeking protection for
their right to reproductive freedom. Although the number of
states that offer expanded constitutional protection for abortion
funding beyond the federal level remains a minority, the per-
centage is growing."' A substantial number of states have
enacted laws guaranteeing women the right to abortion;3'
both Florida and California have enacted constitutional provi-
sions declaring abortion to be a protected, fundamental state
right.
3 0 6
After the United States Supreme Court ruling in Harris v.
McRae that states are not required to fund medically necessary
abortions under Medicaid, thirteen states have continued to
provide coverage through state funds for poor women despite
the federal government's refusal to reimburse these costs.3"
o1 See infra notes 305-321 and accompanying text.
'0' Kolbert & Gans, supra note 259, at 1148. One reason for the Court's erosion
is the appointment of conservative Justices by the Bush and Reagan administra.
tions including Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and the
elevation of Vlliam Rehnquist to Chief Justice-all of whom expressed dissatis-
faction with Roe-and Clarence Thomas. Clinton's appointees, however, have
changed the make-up of the Court. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Stephen
Breyer both are pro-choice. See, Kimberley A. Chaput, Abortion Rights Under State
Constitutions, 70 OR. L. REV. 593, n.6 (1991).
3' See infra notes 305-321 and accompanying text.
... See infra notes 305-321 and accompanying text.
"'6 These states include Connecticut, Kansas (contains provisions, however, re-
quiring parental notification, informed consent, and 8-hour waiting period), Mary-
land (pending ballot referendum), Nevada, and Washington. Riley, supra note 285,
at 87 (citing The Alan Guttmacher Institute, National Abortion Rights Action
League, The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy).
Riley, supra note 235.
'7 These states include: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts;
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, Washington and West
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Eight states, including New Jersey and Connecticut, extend
Medicaid funding for abortions through their expanded pre-
natal programs.0 8 These states have expanded interpretation
of their own constitutions to protect poor women's right to
abortion beyond those afforded under the federal Constitu-
tion.0 9 Several of these states have upheld funding for medi-
cally necessary abortions under the state due process
clause.31 In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers,"' California's highest court agreed that the state was
Virginia. See National Abortion Rights Action League Foundation, Who Decides? A
State-By-State Review of Abortion Rights 162-65 (1991). Another six states-Iowa,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-funded abortions in
the case of rape or incest even before they were mandated to do so by Cintons
1993 Executive Order to the Hyde Amendment. Little Rock Farn. Plan. Srv., PA.
v. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. 609, 617 n.4 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
" Philip Cates, Albany Pact on Prenatal Care Excludes Abortions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1989, at B2.
" This expansion is generally accomplished through the state due process
andfor equal protection clauses. See, Planned Parenthood Ass'n, Inc- v. Department
of Human Resources of State of Oregon, 663 P.24 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (denbl
of state medical assistance funding for medically necessary abortions violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution), affd on statutory
grounds, 687 P.2d 785 (Or. 1984). Also, many claims unsuccessfully attack the
restrictions under the State's freedom of religion clause. See also Ellen Relkin &
Sudi Solomon, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 27, 59-66 (1986).
Two of the states that upheld the funding restrictions for abortions construed
their state constitutions consistent with the federal constitution. But tee Doe v.
Department of Soc. Servs. of Michigan, 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 1992). In this case,
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld § 109A of the Social Welfare Act as consti-
tutiona], although it prohibited use of public funds to pay for abortion unless nec-
essary to save the mother's life. I. at 169. Interestingly, from 1976 to 1987,
Michigan used its own money to pay for abortions and then in 1987 passed a
referendum limiting that practice. Id.; see also, Fischer v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) (no state or federal funds for abortion because
state policy favors childbirth except when life of mother endangered, or she's vic-
tim of rape, incest, upheld); Kolbert & Gans, supra note 259, at 1162 n.70 (citing
Doe v. Department of Soc. Servs., 487 N.W.2d 166, 174) (Mich. 1992) (state court,
in upholding funding restriction, construed its constitution "consistent with the
Federal Constitution, declining a broader, more independent interpretation.1; IDA-
HO CODE § 56-209c (1982 Cum. Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981).
'10 See Kindley v. Governor of Maryland, 426 A.2d 908 (Ald. 1981) (upholding a
statute authorizing funding for medically necessary abortions because excluding
women who require this medical procedure would constitute an impermissible
burden on their right to choose); Women's Health Ctr. of W. Va. v. Panepinto, 446
SE.2d 658 (W.Va. 1993); Doe v. Celani No. $81-84CnC, slip op. (Vt. Super. Ct.
Chitteneden County 1986) (denial of funding for medically necessary abortions vio-
lates state constitution common benefit and safety clauses), cited in Kolbot &
Gans, supra note 259, at 1161 n.69.
311 625 P.2d 779 (CaL 1981).
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not required to fund medical care for the poor. 2 Once the
state decided to do so, however, the court found that it could
not selectively grant these benefits based on criteria that had
nothing to do with need. In Myers, the state could not ex-
clude certain recipients solely because they had sought to exer-
cise their constitutional right to abortion.314 The court rea-
soned that requiring recipients to give birth in order to receive
Medicaid benefits was unconstitutional because this criterion
was unrelated entirely to whether these women were in fact
needy. 5
States also have used their state equal protection clauses
to broaden abortion rights beyond the scope afforded under the
Federal Constitution with regard to abortion funding.316  In
Doe v. Maher,317 Connecticut invalidated its restrictive abor-
tion-funding statute, basing its decision on its Due Process
clause, Equal Protection clause, and Equal Rights Amend-
ment. 8 The Connecticut statute limited state funding of
" Id. at 784 ("the state has no constitutional obligation to provide medical care
to the poor").
" Id. at 798 ("Once the state furnishes medical care to poor women in general,
it cannot withdraw part of that care solely because a woman exercises her consti-
tutional right to choose to have an abortion."); id at 786 ("California courts have
repeatedly rejected the argument that because the state is not obligated to provide
a general benefit, it may confer such a benefit on a selective basis which excludes
certain recipients solely because they seek to exercise a constitutional right.").
3" Id. at 786.
316 Id.
16 See Mat-Su Coalition for Choice v. Valley Hosp. Ass'n, No. 3PA-92-1207
(Alaska Super. Ct., 3d Dist. Feb. 9, 1993) (preliminarily enjoining community
hospital's ban on abortion services under the Alaska Constitution's privacy guaran-
tee), cited in Kolbert & Gans, supra note 259, at 1161 n.62; Dodge v. Department
of Soc. Servs., 657 P.2d 969 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186,
1191-92 (Fla. 1989) (parental consent statute violates explicit state constitutional
right to privacy); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 400 (Mass.
1981) (The State Declaration of Rights affords greater degree of protection to the
right of abortion than does the federal Constitution as interpreted by Harris v.
McRae); North Carolina v. Stam, 267 S.E.2d 335, 342 (establishing an abortion
fund to "ensure that low income women have a meaningful opportunity to exercise
their constitutional choice to terminate their pregnancies"), modified by 275 N.E.2d
439 (N.C. 1980); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982) (New
Jersey Constitution is broader than United States Constitution. Thus, the right to
choose is fundamental for all women and state cannot discriminate between indi-
gent women who require funding for medically necessary abortions from those that
require funding for childbirth).
317 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986).
3a CONN. CONST. art. I, § 1, 20.
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Medicaid abortions to situations where the mother's life was
endangered. The court found the statute to be unconstitutional
because it infringed upon a woman's right to privacy under
state law319 which included the right to seek an abortion and
to preserve one's health. The court concluded that the stat-
ute violated these principles because the scheme denied fund-
ing for necessary medical expenses for indigent women while
paying for all necessary medical costs incurred by indigent
men.
321
C. Why The New York Court of Appeals Avoided The
Constitutional Questions
1. Courts' Reluctance To Decide Constitutional Questions
One reason why at least a few members of the court of
appeals may have been disinclined to expand the state consti-
tutional right to abortion is that courts generally hesitate to
interpret constitutions and do so in as few cases as possi-
ble.3' The United States Supreme Court has employed a va-
riety of devices to avoid answering difficult constitutional law
questions, a desirable result in many instances.' Unlike the
legislative and executive departments, the Court is not a repre-
sentative branch of the public. It therefore cautiously proceeds
to avoid the appearance that its decision was merely a surren-
der to political pressure. This type of politically motivated
decision compromises the Court's integrity by making it indis-
tinguishable from the other two branches although the federal
judiciary is supposed to be removed from the political are-
, Maher, 515 A.2d at 157.
I& at 150 ("Surely, the state constitutional right to privacy includes a
woman's guaranty of freedom of procreative choice."); id. at 151 ('these . . . funda-
mental rights of privacy--the right to secure an abortion!).
32 Id. at 159.
' See infra notes 323.331 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court's adherence to stare decisis and its reluctance to over-
rule a principle is another possible reason why the Court is averme to addressing
a constitutional issue. In Casey, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court's
integrity could be questioned if the Court overruled a rule absent a compelling
reason demonstrating it was not a surrender to political pressure or in response to
a change in the composition of the Court. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
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na.3 24 Overruling a particularly controversial precedent with-
out the most compelling reason, for example, flies in the face of
stare decisis and seriously threatens the Court's legitimacy.
In contrast, by taking a more modest approach to a case
and not deciding a constitutional question, courts give the
legislature room to act and amend. Once a constitutional ques-
tion is decided, discussion ends; the public can no longer peti-
tion the legislature because, as a practical matter, legislative
debate on the matter is forestalled. On the federal level, for
example, amending the Constitution is an excruciatingly diffi-
cult task." Indeed, Congress has only accomplished this on
five occasions after it disagreed with a Supreme Court rul-
ing.121 On the other hand, striking down a law on statutory
grounds more readily permits the legislature to make the nec-
essary changes. It also gives the public time to accept new
principles through a natural political process of consensus-
building. When a state court charges ahead constitutionally
before society is ready, the state may face backlash.327 It
"' Id. See also Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
4' See LAURENCE I. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-6, 65 (2d ed.
1988).
" Id. at 65 n.10 and U.S. CONST. amend. XI (limited jurisdiction of federal
courts); contra Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (prior broad inter.
pretation to hear suits brought against states without states' consent); id. amend.
XIV, § 1 (nullifying decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856), that Americans of African decent, whether slave or free, could not be
deemed citizens of United States); id. amend. XVI (nullifying decision in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), holding federal income tax un-
constitutional unless apportioned); id. amend. XXVI (nullifying decision in Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), that Congress was without power to set voting
age in state elections; the amendment set the age at eighteen). See also id.
amend. XIX (reversing decision in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162
(1874), that women may be denied the right to vote). Unlike the above amend-
ments, the 19th, ratified in 1920, was not widely perceived as a reaction to a
specific court case.
"' See, e.g., cases of noncompliance following Brown v. Board of Education deci-
sion: Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ("freedom of choice" plan held
inadequate compliance with desegregation requirements and 10-year delay intolera-
ble); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Brown
after official resistance in Little Rock, Arkansas in which the Governor called in
the National Guard to block integration of Little Rock's Central High School);
Davidson M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During
the Decade after Brown, 89 Nw. L. REV. 92 (1994). See also RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1st ed. 1976); Michael J. KMarman, Brown,
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therefore may be best to let certain issues go naturally through
the political process before the judicial branch intervenes.
In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,' Justice
Brandeis set forth a sketch of how the Supreme Court avoids
constitutional questions. The Court "refuses unnecessarily
to anticipate constitutional questions, formulates rules only as
Racial Change & the Cvil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 13 (1994) (discus-
sion of governor's decision to call in National Guard). Justice Felix Frankfurter
wanted to prevent a premature vote on school desegregation because in 1952 the
Court was not yet united. He feared that a divided opinion and ciashing opinions
might have "reduced the Court's standing and ignited a racial warfare in the
South." Id. at 600. Moreover, he was convinced that any desegregation process
that the Court would order must not be "a drastic one, instant and univeral. it
would probably have to allow the South to make the adjustment" Id.
Aore recently, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's decision requiring the state to
prove a compelling governmental interest in order to justify the denial of marriage
licenses to homosexual couples also demonstrates this point. Although state laws
on homosexual relations have moved from prohibition to tolerance over the past
three decades, the gay marriage issue remains controversial and has been dividing
the country. Melanie Xlrkpartick, Rule of Law: Gay Marriage: Who Should Dz-
cide?, WALL ST. J., Mfar. 13, 1996, at A15. New York has taken come steps to-
wards recognizing homosexual rights. For example, New York recognizes gay cou-
ples as a family for the purpose of rent-controlled housing. Braschi v. Stahl Assoc.
Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). The court of app-3als
also has permitted an unmarried partner of a child's biological mother to become
the second parent to the child by adoption. Jacob v. Dana, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 660
N.X.2d 397, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1995). New York's reluctance to go any farther,
however, is demonstrated by the fact that in Jacob v. Dana, the court had the op-
portunity "to signal that it was ready to clarify that the denial of a marriage
license to a same-sex couple was unconstitutional" but the court "has not yet
reached that point." City Gets Cold Feet ouer Gay MarriagelOfficials Say Timing
Isn't Right, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 1995 WL 5309488, Dec. 4, 1995.
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
Id at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Court developed.., a series of rules under which it has avoided
passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon
it for decision. They are im part] [1.] The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non.adversarial proceed-
ing . .. because to decide such questions "is legitimate only in the last
resort" . . . [2.] The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." ... (3.] The Court will
not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applie" ... (4.] The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of .... [7.] "When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if serious doubt of constitution-
ality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascer-
tain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided."
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broad as necessary for the case at hand, prefers decisions on
non-constitutional grounds, and construes statutes where pos-
sible to avoid constitutional problems."s0 These devices are
based on a principle that courts "do not review issues, especial-
ly constitutional issues, until they have to."331
2. The New York Court of Appeals' Reluctance to Broaden
the State Constitution: The Scott and Keta Cases
The vigorous dissenting opinions in both People v.
Keta,"2 and People v. Scott333 indicate that at least some
members of the court of appeals would not have been prepared
to expand New York State constitutional coverage for abortion
rights beyond those afforded by the Federal Constitution.'
"0 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154.55 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); TRIBE, supra note 268 at 72, n.1; see also Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 306-07 (1980) ("It is well settled that if a case may be de-
cided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, this Court, for sound jurispru.
dential reasons will inquire first into the statutory question. This practice reflects
the deeply rooted doctrine 'that we ought not to pass on questions of constitution-
ality ...unless such adjudication is unavoidable.') (quoting Spector Motor Serv.,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)); Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119,
133-34 & n.15 (1977) (relying on discretionary consideration to refuse review of
"important constitutional issues," despite the "availability of thoroughly prepared
attorneys to argue both sides ...and of numerous amici curiae ready to assist in
the decisional process, all of them 'stand[ing] like greyhounds in the slips, strain-
ing upon the start"); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48
(1936).
"3' Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 154-55. Justice O'Connors
concurrence in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985), echoed this
principle when she advised that a federal court should await a definitive construc-
tion by the state court rather than precipitously indulge in a facial challenge to
the constitutional validity of a state statute. Id. at 507.
32 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (striking down un-
der Art. I., § 12 of state constitution warrantless administrative search of auto-
mobile dismantling business even if used to determine whether businesses dealing
with stolen automobile parts).
79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 NYE.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (forbidding war-
rantless searches of open fields with posted "No Trespassing" signs or other means
indicating unmistakably private property).
"' Eve Cary & Mary R. Falk, People v. Scott & People v. Keta: Democracy Be-
gins in Conversation, 58 BROOK L. REV. 1279, 1323 (1993) ("Mhe New York
Court of Appeals [has] been 'uncommonly divided' for at least the past five years
over state constitutional law cases, particularly those in which they have been
called upon to interpret a provision of the New York State Constitution more
broadly than the United States Supreme Court has already interpreted an analo-
gous federal provision.") (quoting Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 503, 593 N.E.2d. at 1346, 583
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The dissenting opinions in these two cases primarily opposed
the lack of methodology the majority used when it rejected an
interpretation of the Federal Constitution offered by the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court.'
In Scott, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in New
York v. Berger"' that permitted an administrative search
similar to the one in Scott. Instead, the court struck down a
state statute authorizing this type of search under the state
constitution.' 7 The court of appeals again rejected the federal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Keta when it re-
fused to apply the "open fields" doctrine,' despite its valida-
tion under Oliver v. United States. 9 The rationale for both
rejections of the United States Supreme Court's rulings was
based upon the principle that the New York Constitution and
New York's search and seizure jurisprudence offer more expan-
sive protection of individual rights-and particularly the right
of privacy-than that afforded under federal law."
The dissenters in Scott and Keta vehemently objected to
the expansion of the New York State Constitution by the
majority.3  They criticized the majority for ignoring prece-
N.Y.S.2d at 938) (Kaye, C.J., concurring). Compare Bellacosa's harsh criticism of
the "New Federalism," id. at 1297, with Chief Judge Judith Kaye as one of the
most committed adherents to the "New Judicial Federalism" movement which em-
phasizes independent state constitutional analysis especially in areas in of indi-
vidual rights. Id. at 1323 n.24. See also Kaye, supra note 220.
"s Cary & Falk, supra note 334 at 1280.
"' 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
= In Oliver v. United States, the Supreme Court created a bright line rule that
the Fourth Amendments protection of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" simply
does not extend to areas outside the "curtilage" of the home--those areas that are
not in the immediate proximity of the home. 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1934). In Oliver,
the Court upheld a warrantless search on private property because the search was
conducted in "open fields and therefore was outside of the curtilage of the home.
Id. at 181. In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the open fields
doctrine in People v. Scott because New York State "citizens are entitled to more
protection." 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927. In Scott,
the court of appeals invalidated a warrantless search that was similar to the one
upheld in Oliver. Id. at 491, 593 NY..2d at 1338, 583 N.YS.2d at 930.
=' 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
34 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.YS.2d at 927; Keta, 79
N.Y.2d at 496, 593 N.E.2d at 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 934 (Titone, J., concurring).
31 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 517, 593 N.E.2d at 1355, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 947 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting) (The Court today points to no history or tradition of this State ...
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
dent and failing to apply a non-interpretative approach to
determine whether New York should in fact depart from feder-
al precedent. 2 A non-interpretative analysis includes exami-
nation of pre-existing state statutory or common law defining
the scope of individual rights, the history and tradition of the
state, the right identified in the state constitution as being
peculiar in state or local concern, and distinctive attitudes of
its citizenry towards the specific right.13 The dissenters ar-
gued that in the absence of a textual difference between the
state and federal constitution or a '"nique character of the
particular state that distinguishes it from the rest of the na-
tion," the court is not justified in departing from the federal
interpretation of the parallel provision,3 4 particularly be-
cause both the government and public need uniformity in fed-
eral and state constitutional law.3 5
States should be cautious before distinguishing themselves
from the nation because such action erodes the perception of a
united nation. 6 By making this type of radical decision,
state courts also may undermine the judicial process, because
warranting extra New York privacy protections. .... ).
' Id. at 510, 593 NE.2d at 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (Bellacosa, J., dissent-
ing); see also, id. at 506, 593 N.E.2d at 1348, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's declaration of independence from the Supreme Law of the
Land and from this Court's own recent noninterpretative constitutional analysis
and definitive guidance propels the Court across a jurisprudential Rubicon into a
kind of Articles of Confederation time warp. The "movement" has been dubbed the
'New Federalism.").
' Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 509, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942. See also
Cary & Falk, supra note 334 at 1328 and compare the differences between
noninterpretative analysis and interpretative analysis which include difference in
the texts and history of the two constitutions.
" Cary & Falk, supra note 334 at 1321. See also California referendum, Propo-
sition 8, which requires state courts to give the same meaning to a provision in
the California Constitution as is given to the parallel provision in the United
States Constitution. Constitution of the State of California, Article I, § 28(b), Prop-
osition 8, "Victims' Bill of Rights," adopted by public referendum, June 8, 1982.
3,6 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 510, 593 N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 942 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting).
3" James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 761, 827 (1992) ("It can thus be dangerous for the people of a state to say
too vehemently and too often, 'We are fundamentally different from the rest of the
nation.' To talk in that way may be to contribute to the conditions making it
difficult for the state to consider itself, and to remain, a part of the nation. This
danger may well account at least in part for state courts' reluctance to make too
much of constitutional differences.").
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the public believes that the court has usurped the legislative
function. 7 Incoherent or inconsistent constitutional law doc-
trines may emerge. Justice Handler of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court explained the concerns associated with breaking
with federal precedent in State v. Hunt." Although state
courts can and have interpreted state constitutions more
broadly, there is a "danger, however, in state courts turning
uncritically to their state constitutions for convenient solutions
to problems not readily or obviously found elsewhere."u9 Jus-
tice Handler argued that federalism requires a certain degree
of cooperation, and that national judicial history has closely
wed federal and state constitutional doctrine.' A state that
continuously interprets its own constitution independently,
insensitive to federal law and without explaining criteria to
invoke additional state protection, may cause an "erosion or
dilution of constitutional doctrine." 1
3. Abortion Funding Not the Best Case for Defining
Abortion Rights
Abortion funding is a perfect example of an issue in which
state courts are reluctant to depart from federal jurisprudence
because abortion funding is an extremely controversial topic.
More people support the general notion that a woman has a
right to choose abortion rather than the idea that their tax
dollars should be spent to pay for abortions. 2 Abortion fund-
ing is controversial because numerous ethical, moral, and polit-
- George Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-
Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975,
999-1006 (1979).
"4 450 A.2d 952 (NJ. 1982) (rejecting United States Supreme Court conclusion
in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that telephone billing records were not
entitled to 4th Amendment protection).
Id. at 963 (Handler, J., concurring).
Id. at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
Id. at 963-64. Cf. id. at 960, Justice Parshmans concurrence in which he
argues that an independent state analysis, "strengthens the safeguards of funda-
mental liberties."
22 Indeed, some taxpayers who morally oppose abortion, for example, object to
the use of their tax dollars to fund these procedures. Carole A. Corns, Note, The
Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A Proposal to
Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion Funding Provisions, 24 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 371, 373 n.20 (1991) (citation omitted).
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ical issues are tied to it. Anti-choice groups, for example, have
found abortion funding to be a politically vulnerable target and
one of the best ways to reduce the number of abortions short of
overturning Roe v. Wade.13 Abortion funding cases are
"weak" in terms of gathering support for reproductive rights
because of the variety of intertwined, sensitive issues. These
factors include the "backlash against the omnipresence of big
federal government, the resentment toward welfare recipients,
and the concern that society has grown morally lax on issues
related to family and sex." Some may view government's
refusal to fund abortions as a limitation on "big govern-
ment."" Opposition to public funding of abortions also stems
from the view that this benefit is simply another handout to
welfare recipients. 6 Funding abortions for poor women is an
extremely unpopular notion particularly during this time when
both the public and legislators constantly are attacking wel-
fare.'? Furthermore, individuals that morally oppose abor-
tion do not want their tax-dollars being spent in this man-
ner. 
5
In this political climate, it is easy for a politician to ap-
pease many sides-by being tough on welfare and refusing to
fund abortions while at the same time taking a middle ground
on abortion and maintaining a "pro-choice" position. 9 Essen-
tially an anti-funding position is a quid pro quo for a pro-choice
stance. 6' Legislators who favor abortion restrictions and the
prohibition of abortion funding still can pacify the increasingly
influential political right. Meanwhile, the same legislators can
reaTirm their commitment to pro-choice groups by steadfastly
3 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 15 (1990).
364 Id.
3" President Jimmy Carter, for example, demonstrated that he was a Democrat
who understood the limits of the role of "Big Government when he replied to the
Maher v. Roe ruling, "there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy
people can afford and poor people can't. But I don't believe that the Federal Gov-
ernment should take action to try to make these opportunities exactly equal ..."
Id. at 154 (quoting "Transcript on the President's News Conference on Domestic
and Foreign Affairs," N.Y. TBIES, July 13, 1977, at A10).
3" Id. at 378-80.
3, Id. at 157.
33 See supra note 352; see also, e.g., arguments against subsidizing the Vietnam
War.
39 TRIBE, supra note 353 at 153.
... TRIBE, supra note 353, at 157.
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declaring they are "pro-choice". Many people define "pro-choice"
merely as a belief that abortion should not be unconstitution-
al.3 ' Therefore, if legislators adopt the basic position that the
government should not illegalize abortion, they then can label
themselves "pro-choice".
4. Avoiding the "Medicaid Question"
By distinguishing POAP-eligible women from Medicaid-
eligible women, the court of appeals successfully avoided hav-
ing to answer whether the state constitution requires Medicaid
funding for abortions. 62 New York thus far has avoided this
question because the state legislature has included funding for
medically necessary abortions under the state Medicaid pro-
gram." The Medicaid question is complex and involves ex-
tremely sensitive political and public policy questions.
Therefore, by distinguishing PCAP-eligible from Medicaid-
eligible women, the court was able to avoid this controversial
question and continue to defer to the legislature.
311 This definition, however, misses the mark for many pro-choice supporters.
While this limited definition was satisfactory before abortion was legalized, it no
longer is the case for many pro-choice groups. If a woman cannot afford to pay for
an abortion or if she must get parental consent before the state will allow her to
have the procedure, she effectively loses control over her choie whether or not to
have an abortion. The dissenting opinions in Harris and the lower courts' opinions
in Hope v. Perales, supra notes 79-100, 268 and accompanying text, demonstrate
that these restrictions serve as afrmative blocks to abortion. For this reason,
many abortion rights groups have redefined "pro-choice" as including opposition to
parental consent requirements and in favor of Medicaid funding for abortions:
NARAL has dubbed as 'great pretenders" candidates who use pro-choice
rhetoric to 'mask' their pro-life positions [such as] lep. Michael
Hufngton (R) ... noting his vote against federal funding... NARAL
also accused [then] State Senator George Patald (R) of running a cam-
paign of deception" to "hoodwink" NY voters into believing he is pro-
choice-despite what the group claims is a nine-year pro-life abortion
record in the state Legislature [citing] his votes against [Medicaid] fund-
ing and for notification and a 24-[hour] wait period.
Abortion Politics: More on Gag Rule, Great Pretenders, 6 AMERL POL NEV0RK
ABOR. REP., Oct. 17, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Allnews library (New York
Post reporter "notes that the NARAL 'pretenders' bill themselves as pro-choice but
clash on issues like funding and parental consent.") Id.
3'2 See supra note 113 for an explanation of the "Medicaid question."
30 N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 365-a[2], [51b], 18 N.Y.C.R-R. 505.2(o). See also,
Hope v. Perales, 83 N.Y.2d 563, 571-572, 634 NBE.2d 183, 184-85, 611 N.YS.2d
811, 812 (1994).
z" See supra notes 352-361.
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5. The Political Compromise
One can speculate that this decision was a compro-
mise-by misinterpreting the record and ignoring numerous
affidavits, the court did not have to answer these difficult
questions. On the one hand, it did not have to rule abortion
was not a fundamental right. On other hand, it limited the
holding in the case solely to the facts presented. The result
was that the court avoided two of the most important ques-
tions in Hope-whether the court should expand protection of
abortion under the state constitution beyond federal protection
and whether the court should declare abortion a fundamental
state right."5
Many pro-choice advocates would argue that this "waf-
fling" only serves to hurt women, and that the court should
have decided one way or another.366 In their view, if the court
had flatly declared abortion is not a fundamental right, women
could have turned to the legislature and concentrated their ef-
forts on this level. 67 They could have demanded that the leg-
... See Cary & Falk, supra note 334 at 1334, n.289 (Chief Judge Kaye's 'fuzzy'
concurrence in Scott and Keta, which is devoted to defending the majority against
the dissent, is an example of "her well-known talent as a peacemaker and consen-
sus builder rather than her capacity for critical legal thinking.").
" See Birnbaum, supra note 18, at 10 (Hope is a "decision that sparked out-
rage from abortion-rights supporters"); Maureen Fan, Abortion Rule Upheld in NY,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 6, 1994, at A6 (Donna Lieberman, director of the Reproduc-
tive Rights Project of the New York Civil Liberties Union and attorney for the
plaintiffs stated that Hope, "represents a missed opportunity for the Court of Ap-
peals to have recognized a fundamental right broader than the federal right and
to remove abortion from the state legislative agenda, to remove it as a chip that
can be haggled over and bargained away whenever the state needs to expand
health-care services."). Pro-lifers, on the other hand, welcomed the decision.
Birnbaum, supra note 18, at 10 ("Abortion opponents praised the unanimous opin-
ion . . . calling it a 'welcome Mother's Day gift.').
" An example of pro-choicers galvanizing in the wake of an erosion in repro-
ductive rights is the March of Women's Lives on April 5, 1992 in which one-half
million abortion-rights advocates marched in Washington, D.C. to show their
strength while Planned Parenthood v. Casey was pending in the Supreme Court. It
was the biggest pro-choice march and one of the largest political events in the
city's history. Diane Mason, NOW Hopes Washington Protest March Will Inspire
Activism, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, April 3, 1992 at 2A ("Women's movement leaders
called the Webster ruling a 'Watershed' event, saying it would galvanize the public
in support of women."); Christine Spolar, Abortion-Rights Rally Draws Half a Mil-
lion Marchers, WASH. Posr, April 6, 1992 at Al (the 1992 elections "energized
both sides of the abortion issue"). Furthermore, the 1992 march focused on the
fact that if the Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade in Casey, the supporters
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islature enact a constitutional amendment to the state consti-
tution, similar to the federal Freedom of Choice Act
(FOCA)" At the very least, groups could have pressured the
legislature into amending PCAP to include abortion funding.
More people may have been motivated to act if a strong deci-
sion had threatened their rights, just as pro-choicers rallied on
the federal level when Casey came down." Instead, faced
with an uncertain outcome, women may not foresee the poten-
tial danger and therefore, will not be sufficiently alarmed to
actively protest and lobby the legislature for its support.
However, perhaps Hope is not as harmful to the pro-choice
movement as many would believeY ° The court of appeals
carefully and explicitly limited its holding in Hope. At least
now, advocates can wait for a better context to decide these
questions. Hope is extremely narrow and avoids answering the
"Medicaid question." 71 Because Hope simply reflects the real-
ity that the legislature has the power to address problems "one
step at a time,"' 2 it will be easily distinguishable from future
abortion rights cases. It also is important to remember that
courts are extremely reluctant to overturn precedentY
3
were going to concentrate efforts on the Freedom of Choice Act which would write
abortion into law and the Reproductive Health Equity Act, which restored Medic-
aid funding for abortions. Id.
" See H!R 25 and S. 25, 103d Cong., Reg. Sess. 1993-94 (reaffirming Roe v.
Wade and stating that its purpose is to limit states! power to restrict the freedom
of a woman to terminate her pregniancy).
' See supra note 367.
37 See supra note 372-386 and accompanying text.
* See supra note 113.
'2 See, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Supreme Court
adopts a 9bands-off' approach towards regulations of busine3s under the due pro-
cess clause and allows the legislature to address these problems one step at a
time).
I See supra note 323. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 605 U.S. at 853-
67, in which the Supreme Court thoroughly analyzed its decision to uphold the
underpinnings of Roe v. Wade. The Court explained that there is an "obligation to
follow precedent ... [We recognize that no judicial system could do scciety's work
if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.... Indeed, the very
concept of the rule of law ... requires such continuity over time that a respect
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." Id. at 853. The Court then declared
that a decision to overrule "should rest on some special reason over and above the
belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." Id. at 864. See akso Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A basic change in the
law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popu-
lar misconception that this institution is little different from the two political
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Therefore, if the legislature were to fail to provide Medicaid
funding for abortions, for example, Hope will not be an obstacle
for a case that involves the rights of the "poorest of the
poor."3 7 4
Furthermore, a more advantageous context would be one
that avoids altogether the unpopular concept of abortion fund-
ing. A more effective vehicle to define abortion rights would be
a case challenging a provision that harshly restricted access to
abortions, such as a mandatory delay provision or an onerous
informed consent requirement. Pro-choice advocates may find a
warmer reception from the judiciary and the public for this
type of case, because it sidesteps welfare-related issues. Sub-
stantial evidence indicates that a mandatory delay provision
may preclude New York women from having an abortion be-
cause women in rural areas who do not live near abortion
centers could not afford, financially and otherwise, to make
repeated trips to a city clinic .1 5 For these reasons, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court previously has recognized the possi-
bility that certain mandatory delay policies may constitute an
undue burden on women's right to choose.7 '
In addition to this case not being the best forum for set-
tling the abortion rights issue, perhaps a unanimous court, or
at least one that is divided, should be established before hand-
branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this
Court and to the system of law which is our abiding mission to serve.").
"' Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 141 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986) (describing Medic-
aid-eligible women who have significantly more medical problems than the general
population as a result of their existence under poverty conditions [and therefore]
are likely to encounter significantly more medical problems as a result of their
pregnancies ... for which a medically necessary abortion may be indicated").
... See supra notes 137-139, 140.
... See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87 (plurality opinion). The Court recognized that
"[i]n theory, at least, the [24-hour waiting period is a reasonable measure," but
suggested that there may be times when a mandatory delay would constitute an
undue burden. The Court, for example, recognized that this policy will increase
women's exposure to harassment and hostility outside clinics by anti.abortion pro-
testers. Additionally, the Court acknowledged that "those women who have the
fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the
24-hour waiting period will be 'particularly burdensome." Id. (citing lower court's
finding). But see Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1982)
where the Court struck down a parallel provision under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard. See also Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(invalidating informed-consent provision under strict scrutiny standard).
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ing down such an historic decision as the one posed in
HopeY7 In Brown v. Board of Education, for example, Justice
Frankfurter was adamant about presenting a "united front
when the Supreme Court handed down its historic decision
which struck down school segregation lawsY8 A closely divid-
ed court does not have the same power when establishing a
fundamental right as does a declaration by a firmly united
court. The perception of a court's unity is almost as important
as the decision is itselfY9
" Although no abortion decision on the federal level was decided by a unani-
mous Court, many cases which were less splintered provide greater clarity and
precedential value. By the end of the Court's dealings with abortion cses, the
Court was so divided that the decisions resembled more of a patchwork than any
consistent jurisprudence. In turn, with less consistency, the Court was able to
overturn earlier decisions with less trouble.
Roe v. Wade, for example, was decided by a seven to two majority vote. Simi-
larly, early abortion cases at least had a majority vote. In contrast, in the Court's
last decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justices Kennedy, Souter and O'Connor
joined in the plurality decision which articulated the undue-burden test. Every
other member of the Court merely concurred in part and dissented in part with
the plurality decision resulting in four additional opinions. The adverse effect of
this splintering, which developed over two decades, is evidenced by the Court's
inconsistent decisions regarding different types of abortion restrictions. The Court's
gradual acceptance of restrictions severely hampers women's right to choose.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the majority struck down a spousal and
parental consent requirement. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (parental-con-sent requirement
struck down by Casey). In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductie Health, the
majority applied strict scrutiny and stuck down a 24-hour waiting period. 460 U.S.
416 (1983) (overruled by Casey). The Court became more splintered in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, but a five member majority was
still successful in rejecting informed consent and reporting regulations. 476 U.S.
747 (187) (overruled by Casey).
" Philip Elman & Norman Silver, The Solicitor General's Office: Justice
Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946.1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 817, 822-23 (1987)
Frankfurter wanted the Court to deal with the issue (of overruling Plcssy
v. Ferguson] openly, directly, wisely, courageously, and more than any-
thing else, unanimously. He did not want the segregation issue to be
decided by a fractured Court, as it then was.... He wanted the Court
to stand before the country on this issue united and speaking in a single
voice. He felt that whatever it did had to go out to the country with an
appearance of unity, so that the Court as an institution would best be
able to withstand the attacks that inevitably were going to be made on
it.
Id. at 823 (Justice "Jackson's view was that whatever the Court did, it should do
as a united Court; and what he wanted to do was erase Plsmy v. Ferguson . . .
Frankfurter believed that the only result that would "stand both the Court and
the country in good stead [was] a unanimous opinion." KLUGER, cupra note 327, at
599.
" KLUGER, supra note 327, at 600 (In the desegregation case; Frankfurter was
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Pro-choice advocates may best serve their cause by not
dwelling on Hope. Rather, they should use Hope's limitations
to their advantage. Pro-choicers should not view Hope as a lost
opportunity for the court to declare abortion a fundamental
right, or as a step away from state constitutional protection for
abortion funding. Instead, pro-choice groups should limit the
scope of Hope as they were once forced to do with Casey. For
example, in future litigation they can continue to use the
plethora of New York case law that clearly demonstrates a
state expansion of privacy rights.380  Additionally, these
groups can take advantage of the court of appeals' ambiguous
language that "the fundamental right of reproductive choice,
inherent in the due process liberty rights guaranteed by [the]
State Constitution, is at least as extensive as the Federal con-
stitutional right." ' This ambiguity leaves open the possibili-
ty of arguing that the scope of state abortion rights are more
extensive than those protected under the federal Constitution.
Finally, if the "Medicaid question" does indeed arise-if
conservative legislators are successful in eliminating abortion
funding from Medicaid-then Hope may be a useful tool. The
court clearly distinguished Medicaid-eligible women from
PCAP-eligible women in Hope." Additional support for re-
taining abortion funding for Medicaid recipients may be found
in the State of New York's amicus brief in support of the
plaintiffs' in Harris v. McRae.' The Attorney General, on be-
half of the State, argued that the Hyde Amendment's exclusion
of abortions under the federal Medicaid statute will "profound-
.convinced that how the Court presented its ruling would be no less important
than the substantive content of the opinion."). See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955) ('Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'") (citations omit-
ted); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice"); David Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conven-
tional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 790 (1993) ("[IThe appearance of justice will affect public per-
ception of the system's legitimacy. A system consistently seen as unjust will even-
tually lose the allegiance of its citizens. If people perceive the courts as less than
fair decision makers, the moral force courts depend on to ensure complacence with
decisions they make diminishes").
35 See supra notes 202-219.
381 Hope v. Perales, 83 N.Y.2d 563, 575, 634 N.E.2d 183,186, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811,
814 (1994).
Id. at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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ly affect the liberty interest guaranteed to poor pregnant wom-
en by the United States Constitution and New York State
law.' The brief further argued that the Hyde Amendments
posed, "an undue burden on the fundamental right of women
to choose to terminate a pregnancy."' s  If the State itself sup-
ported these constitutional arguments for federal reimburse-
ment of abortions, it would appear entirely inconsistent for its
own state courts to reject these points if the funding was
threatened under the state's program. Moreover, the court of
appeals conceded that an indigent woman's option to exercise
her fundamental right is "arguably foreclosed.' By not fol-
lowing federal precedent, and not dismissing constitutional
claims, the court left the door open for potential state constitu-
tional challenges to any statute eliminating Medicaid funding
for abortions. For these reasons, the court's compromise may
actually prove to be beneficial to abortion rights in the long
run.
CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals failed to answer whether
abortion rights are protected independently and beyond the
scope of the federal constitution. Rather than viewing Hope as
' ' Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorney General of the State of New York in
Support of the Plaintiffs-Appellees, Harris v. M cRae, No. 79-1268 (October Term
1979), Appendix 662, supra note 30, at 663.
' Id. at 671. See also id. at 669 ("[Wlhis case is not primarily a matter of tho
funding of medically necessary abortions; it is rather a matter of their availabili-
ty . . . because the Hyde Amendments would have the result (which their propo-
nents dearly intended) of effectively prohibiting poor woman (sic) from having
medically necessary abortions, they are unconstitutional.") See also id. at 673 ("By
excluding the majority of medically necessary abortions from the certifiable catego-
ries, the Hyde Amendments compel Medicaid-eligible women to resort to
'alternatives' ranging from illegal abortion to mental derangement ... [and] this
legislation erects an 'absolute obstacle to a woman's decision" to terminate her
pregnancy as protected by the constitution.) (quoting Planned Parenthood of cent.
Mlo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71, n.11 (1976)). The enactments therefore -brutally
coerce poor women to bear children ... .7 Id. (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,
456 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
'" Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.. 2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816. ("The
case before us is significantly different. Unlike an indigent woman, whose option
to choose an abortion is arguably foreclosed by her lack of resources, the PCAP-
eligible woman . . . presumptively has the financial means to exercise her funda-
mental right of choice.").
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an obstacle to reproductive freedom, the pro-choice movement
can limit the adverse effect of the decision and even try to use
it to their advantage. First, pro-choice organizations can limit
Hope to its extremely narrow holding. If the question of Medic-
aid funding for abortion arises, the challengers can rely on
Hope as explicitly distinguishing between PCAP-eligible and
Medicaid-eligible women. 7 Secondly, because the court re-
served the option to expand the state constitution for abortion
rights, women can wait for a stronger case to define the scope
of such liberties.' Lastly, women should continue to pres-
sure the legislature to amend PCAP, emphasizing the evidence
that indicates that women in the PCAP program cannot afford
abortions. By limiting the scope and applicability of Hope, pro-
choice advocates can move beyond this narrow decision and
view it as another tool along the path towards expanding the
scope of abortion rights in New York State.
Kelley P. Swift
Id.
SSee supra notes 352-365.
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